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THE MAREVA INJUNCTION IN AID OF
FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS©
BY PAUL MTCHELL*
Courts have long awarded Mareva injunctions to
prevent defendants from frustrating the domestic
litigation process. An emerging question is whether
Canadian courts can orderMareva injunctions in aid of
foreign proceedings. Traditional English authority,
recently confirmed by the Privy Council, says no. Yet
Canadian courts take a different view, and are in the
process of developing principles to guide the awarding
of Mareva relief in aid of foreign proceedings. After a
critical analysis of the debate, this article evaluates
several recent decisions, argues in favour of such a
power, and proposes a framework by which it should be
exercised.
Les tribunaux ont depuis longtemps accord6 des
injonctions Mareva dans le but de pr6venir les
d6fendeurs 6trangers de contrecarrer les litiges
internes. Une des questions a laquelle les tribunaux
canadiens sont pr6sentement confront6s est de cemer
leur comp6tence dans l'mission de telles injonctions
au soutien de proc6dures judiciaires 6trang~res. En
Angleterre, les autorit6s y sont oppos6es, tel que le
Conseil priv6 'a r6cemment conirm6. Toutefois, les
tribunaux canadiens prennent une tangente diff~rente,
puisqu'ils 61aborent actuellement de nouveaux
principes directeurs pour l'mission d'injonctions
Mareva au soutien de proce6dures judiciaires
6trangeres.. Suite A une analyse critique de ce debat,
cet article examine plusieurs d6ecisions r6centes, prend
position en faveur d'un tel pouvoir, et propose un
encadrement dans lequel celui-ci pourrait 6tre exerc6.
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I. INTRODUCTION
You are pursuing litigation against a defendant in a foreign
forum. The defendant owns assets located in Canada. However, she has
insufficient connections with Canada for a Canadian court to establish
personal jurisdiction over her by way of service ex juris. Consequently,
no action could be brought against her here. You are concerned that the
defendant may spirit her Canadian assets away before you can obtain a
judgment abroad and have it enforced against the defendant's assets in
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Canada. May a Canadian court order a Mareva injunction in aid of
foreign legal proceedings to freeze the defendant's assets in Canada
pending judgment abroad and enforcement of the foreign judgment
here?
Provisional and protective measures in transnational litigation,
of which Mareva injunctions are but one instance,' have historically
suffered a low profile in Anglo-Canadian law.2 Yet, faced with
technological and political developments that facilitate the movement of
assets across borders,3 the common law's traditional ambivalence
towards pre-judgment provisional and protective measures is, by
necessity, eroding.4  Two recent cases-one involving a series of
high-profile Canadian proceedings, United States v.Friedland,S the other
an important decision of the Privy Council on appeal from the Court of
1 Aside from Mareva injunctions, other forms of provisional and protective measures ihclude
preservation orders, orders for the interim appointment of receivers, custodians or experts, orders
for security for costs, and orders for the sale and disposition of perishable goods. They are
discussed in greater detail in Part VI(E), below.
2 For a fuller discussion of provisional and protective measures in the international context,
see C. Kessedjian, "Measures provisoires et conservatoires i propos d'une resolution adopt~e par
l'Association de droit international" (1997) J. Dr. Int'l 103; L. Collins, Essays in International
Litigation and the Conflict of Laws (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) c. 1; and P.F. Schlosser,
"Coordinated Transnational Interaction in Civil Litigation and Arbitration" (1990) 12 Mich. J. Int'l
L. 150.
3 Derby & Co. LtL v. Weldon (Nos. 3 & 4), [1990] Ch. 65 at 95 (C.A.), Neill L.J. [hereinafter
Derby Nos. 3 & 4] ("assets, like the Cheshire cat, may disappear unexpectedly. It is also to be
remembered that modern technology and the ingenuity of its beneficiaries may enable assets to
depart at a speed which can make any feline powers of evanescence appear sluggish by
comparison."); Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaf M.B.H. v. R'As al Khaimah National Oil
Co., [1990] 1 A.C. 295 at 317 (C.A.), Sir John Davidson M.R. [hereinafter Deutsche Schachtbau]
(experience has shown the Mareva injunction "to be one of the most imaginative, important and, on
the whole, most beneficent [innovations] of modern times..."), rev'd in part on other grounds, [1990]
1 A.C. 323 (H.L.).
4 See also art. 3138 of the Civil Code of Quebec, An Act to Establish a New Civil Code and to
Reform Family Law, S.Q. 1980, c. 39 [hereinafter ccQ], discussed infra at text accompanying notes
179-181.
5 The United States v. Friedland litigation consists of five distinct phases: United States v.
Friedland (20 August 1996) Vancouver Reg. C. 963067 (B.C.S.C.), order of Spencer J. [unreported]
[hereinafter Friedland No. 1]; United States v. Friedland (21 August 1996) (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)),
Borins J. [unreported] [hereinafter Friedland No. 2]; United States v.Friedland, [1996] B.C.J. No.
3018 (S.C.), Saunders J. (QL) [hereinafter Friedland No. 3]; United States v. Friedland (1996), 30
O.R. (3d) 568 (Gen. Div.) [hereinafter Friedland No. 4] (on privilege claim); and United States v.
Friedland, [1996] O.J. No. 4399 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), Sharpe J. (QL) [hereinafter FriedlandNo. 5].
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Appeal for Hong Kong,6 Mercedes-Benz AG v. Leiduck7-illustrate the
utility of Mareva injunctions in aid of foreign legal proceedings, but
provide conflicting indications as to their availability. Much remains
unsettled. This article aims to provide some guidance as to the future
development of this important innovation.8
A Mareva injunction,9 commonly issued ex parte, restrains a
defendant from transferring or disposing of specified assets from the
jurisdiction in which the motion is brought, pending judgment.10 These
injunctions have been available from the Canadian courts for at least
fifteen years.11 The jurisdiction to awardMareva injunctions is statutory,
6 Obviously, Privy Council decisions no longer bind Canadian courts (and of course, they never
bound the English courts except in a narrow range of subject-matter). Yet, the Privy Council has
decided a number of important conflict of laws appeals in recent years: see, for example, Showlag v.
Mansour, [1995] 1 A.C. 431 (resjudicata in recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments);
Owens Bank Ltd. v. Etoile Commerciale s.A., [1995] 1 W.LR. 44 (fraud as defence to enforcement of
foreign judgment); Red Sea Insurance Co. v. Bouygues s.A., [1995] 1 A.C. 190 (choice of law in tort);
The Pioneer Container, [1994] 2 A.C. 324 (stay of proceedings due to choice of court clause in favour
of foreign court); and S.N.L Adrospatiale v. Lee Kui Jak, [1987] A.C. 871 [hereinafter S.N.L
Airospatiale] (anti-suit injunctions). Moreover, as major commercial and financial centres, the
experience of London and Hong Kong is surely instructive for the development of the law in
Canada. The Mareva injunction originated and developed in England, and most of its subsequent
evolution has taken place there, so it is natural that Canadian courts should look abroad for
guidance.
7 [1996] A.C. 284 (P.C.) [hereinafter Mercedes-Benz].
8 See also M.A. Skene, "Commercial Litigation Beyond the Pale: A Comparison of
Extraterritorial Antisuit and Mareva Jurisdiction Exercised by the Courts of England and British
Columbia in Commercial Disputes" (1996) 30 U.B.C. L. Rev. 1.
9 There is an extensive literature on Mareva injunctions more generally. See, for example, R.
J. Sharpe, Injunctions and Specific Performance, 2d ed. (rev. ed. 1996) (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law
Book, 1992); C.R.B. Dunlop, Creditor-Debtor Law in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1995) at
157-88; S. Gee, Mareva Injunctions andAnton PillerRelief, 3d ed. (London: F.T. Law and Tax, 1995);
R.N. Ough & W. Flenley, The Mareva Injunction andAnton Piller Order. Practice and Precedents, 2d
ed. (London: Butterworths, 1993); I.S. Goldrein & K.H.P. Wilkinson, Commercial Litigation:
Pre-emptive Remedies, 2d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1991); M.S.W. Hoyle, The Mareva
Injunction and Related Orders, 2d ed. (London: Lloyd's, 1989); and D.M. McAllister, Mareva
Injunctions, 2d ed., (Toronto: Carswell, 1987).
10 See Camdex v. Bank of Zambia (No. 2), [1997] 1 All E.R. 728 at 732 (C.A.), Sir Thomas
Bingham M.R. Removal of assets from the jurisdiction (and likely, their transfer to an offshore
haven which does not recognize or enforce foreign judgments) is one of a number of judgment
proofing strategies which a defendant might choose to adopt. Others include concealing assets,
destroying them, or transferring them to third parties, perhaps with the intention that they will be
transferred back after the threat of litigation passes.
11 The leading Canadian case isAetna Financial Services Ltd. v. Feigelman, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 2
[hereinafter Aetna]. See also Chitel v. Rothbart (1982), 39 O.R. (2d) 513 (C.A.); Liberty National
Bank & Trust Co. v. Atkin (1981), 31 O.R. (2d) 715 (H.C.J.); Buraglia v. Humphreys (1982), 39
N.B.R. (2d) 674 (C.A.); and Sekisui House Kabushiki Kaisha (Sekisui House Co. Ltd.) v. Nagashima
(1982), 42 B.C.L.R. 1 (C.A.).
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both in Englandl2 and in the common law provinces of Canada.13 The
Mareva injunction developed in recognition that, in the time gap
between the initiation of a lawsuit and its resolution, court-ordered
protective and provisional measures may be required to ensure that
defendants cannot render themselves judgment-proof. 14 A defendant
must not be permitted to "snap his fingers" at a judgment rendered
against him.15 It should be noted that Mareva injunctions are procedural
in nature: they do not resolve the substantive merits of a legal dispute.
Rather, they ensure that the process of the court is not abused, so that
the dispute may be properly resolved.
A Mareva injunction operates in personam against a defendant,
compelling her to act in a certain manner in respect of particular
assets.16 It is not an attachment in rem of the defendant's assets. No lien
or charge on the defendant's assets is created. The plaintiff does not
gain a preference or priority in the event of the bankruptcy or insolvency
12 Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.), 1981, c. 54, s. 37(1): "The High Court may by order
(whether interlocutory or final) grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which it
appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so."
13 See, for example, Judicature Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. J-1, s. 13(2); Law and Equity Act, R.S.B.C.
1996, c. 253, s. 39; Queen's Bench Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. C280, s. 56(1); Judicature Act, R.S.N.B. 1973,
c. J-2, s. 33; Judicature Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. J-4, s. 105; Judicature Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 240, s. 43(9);
Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 101; Supreme Court Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. S-10, s. 34;
Queen's Bench Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. Q-1, s. 45, para 8; Judicature Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. J-1, s. 41;
Judicature Act, R.S.Y.T. 1986, c. 96, s. 26; Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, s. 44; and Federal
Court Rules C.R.C., c. 663, r. 469(1). Note that New Brunswick r. 40.03 specifically addresses Mareva
injunctions.
14 Mareva Compania Naviera s.A v. International Bulkcarriers s.A., [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 509
(C.A.). Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1093 (C.A.), was actually the first case
in which aMareva injunction was awarded. See also Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine S.A.,
[1979] Q.B. 645 (C.A.) [hereinafter Third Chandris] (early definitive statement of the law governing
Mareva injunctions); and Polly Peck International PLC v. Nadir (No. 2), [1992] 4 All E.R. 769 at 785
(C.A.) [hereinafter Polly Peck] (more recent statement).
15 Rasu Maritima s-4. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara ("The
Pertamina"), [1978] Q.B. 644 at 661 (C.A.), Lord Denning M.R. (citing Kerr J. in the court below).
16 Cretanor Maritime Co. Ltd. v. Irish Marine Ltd., [1978] 1 W.L.R. 966 (C.A.); Aetna, supra
note 11 at 176-77 ("The gist of the Mareva injunction is the right to freeze exigible assets when
found within the jurisdiction, wherever the defendant may reside, providing, of course, there is a
cause of action between the plaintiff and the defendant which is justiciable in the courts of
England"). The defendant must comply with the terms of the injunction upon pain of contempt:
Lin v. Leung (1992), 64 B.C.L.R. (2d) 248 (S.C.). If the plaintiff is making a proprietary claim to
specific assets (as opposed to a personal claim) a Mareva injunction is inappropriate. The proper
procedure is to seek an interlocutory injunction restraining the use or alienation of specific property
on the normal interlocutory injunction threshold: see Polly Peck, supra note 14; and Banco
Ambrosiano Holdings s.A. v. Dunkeld Ranching Ltd. (1987), 85 A.R. 278 (C.A.), leave to appeal
refused, [1988] 1 S.C.R. v.
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of the defendant, although a Mareva injunction does have an important
impact upon third parties.17 Mareva injunctions involve a familiar clash
of values. On the one hand, the courts are concerned to ensure that a
defendant cannot frustrate the plaintiffs ability to enforce a judgment if
he is eventually successful on the merits. Weighing against this,
however, is the defendant's liberty to use, move, or dispose of her assets
as she desires where no liability has yet been imposed upon her.'8
The latter concern to protect the defendant's freedom of action
is partially offset by the relatively stringent conditions which must be met
before aMareva injunction may be ordered. The plaintiff must make full
and frank disclosure of all material matters; give particulars of the claim;
show grounds for believing that there is a risk that the defendant's assets
will be removed or dissipated before judgment; give grounds for
believing that the defendant has assets in the jurisdiction; and,
importantly, give an undertaking in damages.19 Mareva injunctions are
less easily obtainable in Canada than in England 20 Moreover, the
defendant may apply at any time to have the injunction modified or
dissolved. Nonetheless, in practical terms, it must be recognized that a
Mareva injunction may substantially alter the playing field for the
substantive litigation at issue. Where expansion of the range of
circumstances under which a Mareva injunction may be ordered is
proposed, the proposed expansion must be evaluated by determining
whether a proper balance of interests has been achieved.21
17 Some confusion as to the nature of the Mareva injunction has arisen, in part because the
Mareva injunction does possess some features of an in rem order: it binds third parties, and takes
effect immediately, even before notice of it is served on the defendant. See Z. Ltd. v. A-Z and
AA-LL, [1982] Q.B. 558 (C.A.); and P. Devonshire, "The Implications of Third Parties Holding
Assets Subject to a Mareva Injunction" [1996] L.M.C.L.Q. 268. The impact of Mareva injunctions
upon third party financial institutions is particularly important, and accounts in large measure for
the effectiveness of the remedy. See A. Malek & C. Lewis, "Worldwide Mareva Injunctions: The
Position of International Banks" [1990] L.M.C.L.Q. 88.
18 See A.A.S. Zuckerman, "Mareva Injunctions and Security for Judgment in a Framework of
Interlocutory Remedies" (1993) 109 L.Q. Rev. 432; S. Goldstein, "Recent Developments and
Problems in the Granting of Preliminary Relief: A Comparative Analysis" (1987) 40 Rev. H.D.I. 13;
E. Gertner, "Prejudgment Remedies: A Need For Rationalization" (1981) 19 Osgoode Hall L.J.
503; and F.D. Rose, "The Mareva Injunction-Attachment In Personam" [1981] L.M.C.L.Q. 1.
19 Third Chandris, supra note 14 at 668-69.
20 See R. v. Consolidated Fastfrate Transport Inc. (1995), 24 O.R. (3d) 564 at 575 (C.A.)
[hereinafter Fastfrate] (plaintiff must show a strong prima facie case); and Reynolds v. Hannanis
(1995), 39 C.P.C. (3d) 364 (B.C.S.C.).
21 See Chief Constable of Kent v. V., [1983] 1 Q.B. 34 at 49 (C.A.), Donaldson L.J. [hereinafter
Kent] (expressing concern that, without the limits imposed on the jurisdiction to award Mareva
relief by Siskina, infra note 35, the jurisdiction would tend to become exceedingly broad and
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The Mareva injunction has evolved from its narrow initial origins,
and the courts have adapted it to meet new challenges 2 2 For example,
Mareva injunctions are now available where judgment has been rendered
but has not yet been executed.2 3 Similarly, "worldwide" Mareva
injunctions-in personam injunctions restraining the defendant from
disposing of or moving her assets anywhere in the world, regardless of
her present location, or in some cases ordering the transfer of assets
between foreign countries-have been awarded.24 Carefully tailored
modifications have been developed 2 5 A Mareva injunction may be
ordered to restrain the disposition of assets within the jurisdiction where
arbitrary: "every judge would need to be issued with a portable palm tree").
22 While the early cases placed specific limitations upon the availability of Mareva relief
(originally, Mareva relief was limited to cases in the Commercial Court concerning debts where the
defendant was a foreigner outside the jurisdiction and there was a reasonable apprehension of
danger that the assets would be removed from the jurisdiction), these requirements had evaporated
within five years: Barclay-Johnson v. Yuill, [1980] 3 All E.R. 190 (Ch.D.). The ability of the courts to
order Mareva injunctions against foreign and absentee defendants was confirmed in England by the
Supreme Court Act 1981,supra note 12, s. 37(3).
23 Mercantile Group (Europe) AG v. Aiyela, [1994] Q.B. 366 (C.A.) [hereinafter Aiyela];
Babanaft International Co. s.A. v. Bassatne, [1990] Ch. 13 (C.A.) [hereinafter Bassatne]; and Maclaine
Watson & Co. Ltd. v. International Tin Council (No. 2), [1989] Ch. 286 (C.A.). It is unclear whether
such injunctions are available in Canada: compare Hickman v. Kaiser (1996), 28 B.C.L.R. (3d) 195
(S.C.), with Kaiser v. Annett (1993), 82 B.C.L.R. (2d) 199 (S.C.).
24 On worldwide Mareva injunctions, see Bassatne, supra, note 23; Derby & Co. Ltd. v. Weldon,
[1990] Ch. 48 (C.A.) [hereinafter Derby & Co.]; Derby & Co. Ltd. v. Weldon (No. 6), [1990] 1 W.L.R.
1139 (C.A.) [hereinafter Derby No. 6] (court's ability to order transfer of assets from one foreign
jurisdiction to another); Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. (No. 9); Bank of Credit
and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd., [1994] 3 All. E.R. 764 (C.A.); Mooney v. Orr (1994),
100 B.C.L.R. (2d) 335 (S.C.) [hereinafter Mooney]; and Ashtiani v. Kashi, [1987] Q.B. 888 (C.A.)
(upholding refusal to order Mareva injunction against disposition of assets in foreign jurisdiction
and limiting ancillary discovery orders similarly, so that disclosure should be coterminous with the
injunction). See also Zellers Inc. v. Doobay (1989), 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 187 (S.C.) [hereinafter Zellers]
(declining to orderMareva injunction against Ontario assets of defendant on the basis that the court
has no jurisdiction to make such an order). Worldwide Mareva injunctions are awarded on the basis
not of the territorial jurisdiction of the forum court over assets within its jurisdiction, but rather on
the unlimited jurisdiction of the forum court to exercise inpersonam jurisdiction over a person who
is properly made a party to the proceedings before the court: Derby No. 6 at 1149 (where this
approach was justified in part on the basis that an English court is "unwilling to exercise its powers
within this country in support of a receiver appointed by a foreign court, save on very strictly limited
traditional principles of foreign law" at 1150). See discussion in L. Collins, "The Territorial Reach
of Mareva Injunctions" (1989) 105 L.Q. Rev. 262 [hereinafter "Territorial Reach"]; and D. Capper,
"Worldwide Mareva Injunctions" (1991) 54 Mod. L Rev. 329.
25 See, for example, Gidrxslme Shipping Co. v. Tantomar-Transportes Lda., [1995] 4 All E.R.
507 (Q.B.D. (Comm. Ct.)) (Mareva injunction confined to assets within jurisdiction, but defendants
compelled to disclose information as to worldwide assets).
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
the plaintiff brings an action on a foreign judgment26 or arbitral award 27
in the forum, and the plaintiff may apply for service ex juris for this
purpose.28 However, what if a foreign judgment is pending, but has not
yet been rendered? Should Mareva injunctions be available in aid of
foreign legal proceedings?
Consider a scenario in which the parties to a contract include a
choice of court clause in favour of a foreign jurisdiction. A party seeking
to sue on the contract would, in most cases, be barred from bringing suit
in Canada by reason of the clause, and would thus be obliged to pursue
legal remedies abroad.2 9 If the defendant had substantial assets in
Canada, but few assets in the foreign jurisdiction in which suit was
brought, the plaintiff would likely hope to secure a judgment in the
foreign forum, then to have it enforced in one or more Canadian
provinces against the defendant's assets there. What could the plaintiff
do if, in the interim, the defendant began to spirit assets out of Canada
in order to ensure that they could not be used to satisfy a possible
judgment against her should the plaintiff seek to have it registered or
enforced in Canada?
Similarly, in a tort or unjust enrichment case, the defendant
might possess assets in several jurisdictions, but those assets may be
insufficiently concentrated in any one jurisdiction to satisfy the plaintiff's
claim. Moreover, the provinces or states where the assets are located
are likely to be unable to assert personal jurisdiction over an absentee
defendant who has limited contacts with the province or state in
question. Accordingly, the plaintiff would either have to bring parallel
suits in several jurisdictions, or else sue in one jurisdiction and then
attempt to have the resulting judgment registered or enforced in other
jurisdictions in which the defendant had assets. The plaintiff would be
concerned that the defendant might frustrate his efforts to satisfy the
claim by moving her assets between jurisdictions.
In both the contract and tort or unjust enrichment scenarios, the
plaintiff might seek a Mareva injunction from a Canadian court with
regard to the defendant's assets located in Canada. As noted above, the
26 See Hickman v. Kaiser, supra note 23; BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Hunt (1980), 23
A.R. 271 (N.W.T.S.C.); and Hunt v. BP Exploration Company (Libya) Ltd., [1980] 1 N.Z.L.R. 104
(S.C.).
2 7 Deutsche Schachtbau, supra note 3.
28 Ontario, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 17.02(m) [hereinafter Ontario Rules]; see Lawson v.
Lawson, [1964] 2 O.R. 321 (H.C.J.).
29 See discussion in J.-G. Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws, 3d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths,
1994) at 248-52.
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Mareva injunction arose to ensure that defendants do not take unfair
advantage of the interstices between bringing proceedings, receiving
judgment, and execution. The same problems bedevil transnational
litigation, where cases contain elements from more than one jurisdiction.
In my view, strong arguments suggest that, so long as certain conditions
are satisfied, Mareva relief should also be available in aid of legal
proceedings in a foreign forum. I shall outline these arguments, and also
address a number of possible objections to the widening of the scope of
the jurisdiction to awardMareva relief that my proposal entails.
Before doing so, an important clarification must be made. In
determining whether a Mareva injunction may be ordered in aid of
foreign proceedings, there are two distinct jurisdictional issues which
arise. The first is -whether the court possesses the substantive jurisdiction
to order a Mareva injunction against the defendant in the circumstances.
The second is whether the forum court possesses personal jurisdiction
over the defendant, in the sense that it may adjudicate disputes involving
her. For a Mareva injunction to be awarded, personal jurisdiction must
be established over a defendant by service of process, either within the
jurisdiction or outside it by service exiuris.
Even though much debate has focused on the substantive
jurisdiction to award Mareva relief in aid of foreign proceedings, in many
cases the sticking point is likely to be personal, rather than substantive,
jurisdiction. This is so because the exercise of personal jurisdiction is
increasingly tied to the issue of whether the court has a real and
substantial connection to the substantive dispute at issue, and the
defendant's sole connection to the jurisdiction in which the court is
located may be that she possesses assets within that jurisdiction. Unlike
the American quasi in rem attachment jurisdiction,30 or the forms of
30 Historically, many American states allowed for a process of quasi in rem attachment, by
which personal jurisdiction could be established over a defendant on the basis of the presence of his
or her assets in the jurisdiction. Quasi in rem attachment is distinct from the in personam
jurisdiction underlying the Mareva injunction. A Mareva injunction does not itself establish personal
jurisdiction over a defendant on the basis of presence of assets in the jurisdiction. There has been
considerable litigation in the United States concerning the constitutional status of quasi in rem
attachment, specifically, its congruence with the relevant due process clause of the United States
Constitution: U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Simply put, the question has been whether a state court can
assume jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has few or no contacts with that state other
than the presence of assets there. In recent years, quasi in rem jurisdiction has also declined in
relative importance, as most states have expanded the scope of jurisdiction inpersonam through the
enactment of long-arm jurisdiction statutes. See discussion in S.A. Riesenfeld, Cases and Materials
on Creditors' Remedies and Debtors' Protection, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1987) c. 1 and 7; E.F.
Scoles & P. Hay, Conflict of Laws (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1982) c. 7; and R. Wasserman, "Equity
Renewed: Preliminary Injunctions to Serve Potential Money Judgments" (1992) 67 Wash. L. Rev.
257 (advocating use of Mareva-type injunctions rather than attachment). See also Restatement
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foreign attachment known in many European civil law states,3 1 personal
jurisdiction over an absentee defendant for the purpose of issuing a
Mareva injunction is not established by the mere presence of the
defendant's assets in the territorial jurisdiction of the court.32
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the extension of the jurisdiction
of Canadian courts to award Mareva relief in aid of foreign proceedings
is judicial unfamiliarity with the prospect of taking positive steps in aid
of foreign courts or tribunals. Canadian courts are increasingly aware of
the need to respect principles of comity and reasonableness in
transnational litigation. For the most part, however, the exercise of this
respect has come in the form of judicial self-restraint in order to avoid
taking measures which would antagonize or interfere with courts and
tribunals in foreign states. The issuance.of a stay of proceedings on the
basis of the forum non conveniens doctrine provides a prime example.
Yet, at times, comity may require positive rather than negative
measures from Canadian courts. Canadian courts are not entirely
unfamiliar with the exercise of judicial assistance in aid of foreign
tribunals, as their experience with letters of request demonstrates. This
article seeks to demonstrate that, in some cases, principles of
reasonableness and comity suggest that Canadian courts should take
positive steps to ensure that, in La Forest J.'s felicitous phrase,
individual litigants do not "pay the inevitable price of unfairness" should
domestic courts fail to coordinate their processes with those of foreign
(Second) of Judgments (St. Paul, Minn.: American Law Institute, 1982) § 8(1)(c).
31 The civil procedure of several European states enables provisional attachment of assets
where judgment is pending abroad against the assets of the potential debtor which are within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, a process known as saisie conservatoire. There is a distinction
between forum arresti (jurisdiction assumed over foreigners by attachment of their property, in
which judgment is limited to the value of the property so seized, as in the United States) and fonm
patrimonii (in which personal jurisdiction is assumed on the basis of the presence of the defendant's
assets in the forum, and there is no limit to the scope of jurisdiction so taken, as in Germany). See
generally J. Grunert, "Interlocutory Remedies in England and Germany: A Comparative
Perspective" (1996) 15 Civ. Just. Q. 18; and M.J. Dominguez, "Using Prejudgment Attachments in
the European Community and the U.S." (1995) 5 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 41.
32 At one time in English law, jurisdiction could be established over foreigners on the basis of
the presence of assets within the jurisdiction. But this practice was effectively ruled obsolete, as it
was held to be strictly personal, so that it did not to apply to corporations: Mayor of London v.
London Joint Stock Bank Ltd. (1881), 6 App. Cas. 393 (H.L.). Nonetheless, American courts had
earlier adopted the English rule, and continue to apply it (subject to due process requirements) to
corporate and individual defendants. See discussion in The Pertamina, supra note 15 at 657; and
Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (foreign attachment). The distinction between assumption of
jurisdiction on the basis of seizure of property and the seizure of property to prevent a debtor from
frustrating an eventual judgment may seem thin, but it is there: see Shafferv. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977) [hereinafter Shaffer].
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courts and tribunals.33 The Mareva injunction in aid of foreign
proceedings can play an important role in this coordinating process.
II. THE SISKINA PRINCIPLE AND ITS EROSION: IS A CAUSE
OF ACTION IN THE JURISDICTION REQUIRED?
A. The Siskina
The argument for the availability of Mareva injunctions in aid of
foreign proceedings goes against the weight of conventional authority.
As traditionally understood, a Mareva injunction is available only where
a cause of action is brought in the jurisdiction in which the injunction is
sought 3 4 This was the view propounded by the House of Lords in the
leading English case, Siskina (owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board) v.
Distos Compania Naviera S.A.,S in which Lord Diplock held that an
interlocutory injunction may be granted only to protect or assert a legal
or equitable right which could be enforced by a final judgment in the
jurisdiction.3 6
In Siskina, cargo owners sued shipowners in London, seeking
damages for breach of duty or contract, and a Mareva injunction
restraining the disposition of certain insurance proceeds or their removal
from England. In reality, the cargo owners sought only an injunction to
restrain the shipowners from removing the insurance proceeds from
England, pending the disposition of an anticipated action in the
33 Hunt v. T&N PLC, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 at 295.
34 A similarly restrictive approach is also said to apply to Anton Piller orders: Altertext Inc. v.
Advanced Data Communications Ltd., [1985] 1 All E.R. 395 (Ch. D.) (declining to issue an Anton
Piller order against a foreign defendant who had not yet been served with a writ and given the
opportunity to apply to have leave to serve him exjuris set aside). The mere presence of property
within the jurisdiction is insufficient to establish the court's jurisdiction or to substitute for a cause
of action. On extraterritorial Anton Piller orders, see Protector Alarms v. Maxim Alarms, [1978]
F.S.R. 442 (Ch.D).
35 [1979] A.C. 210 at 256 [hereinafter Siskina].
3 6 Ibid. at 253. See also L. Collins, ed., Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, 12th ed.
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993) at 194-95 [hereinafter Dicey & Morris]; Sharpe, supra note 9 at 1
2.1090. Note, however, that a Mareva injunction may be ordered where the plaintiff has a statutory
cause of action: Securities and Investments Board v. Pantell s.4., [1990] Ch. 426. It might be thought
that a quia timet injunction would also be an exception to this general rule, and that a similarly
flexible approach to the "existing cause of action in the jurisdiction" requirement should also apply
to Mareva injunctions. However, a quia timet injunction is awarded either as final relief, or else as
relief which is ancillary to another substantive cause of action, (Le., it is not "free-standing" relief).
See discussion in Gee, supra note 9 at 111; and Mercedes-Benz, supra note 7.
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Genoese courts brought by the cargo owners. The cargo owners also
sought leave of the Court to serve the writ on the shipowners in
Greece.37
The Mareva injunction was initially awarded, but later set aside
on application by the shipowners. The cargo owners successfully
appealed to the Court of Appeal, 38 but the House of Lords reversed.
The Law Lords held that the power of the High Court to order an
interlocutory injunction 39 "presupposes the existence of an action, actual
or potential, claiming substantive relief which the High Court has
jurisdiction to grant and to which the interlocutory orders referred to are
but ancillary." 40 The corollary is that a plaintiff cannot obtain interim or
ancillary relief in aid of foreign proceedings until an action is brought in
the forum on the basis of the foreign proceedings, i.e., to register or
enforce the resulting foreign judgment or arbitral award.4 1 The Court
had no jurisdiction over the dispute because it could not allow service
out on the defendants, so that personal jurisdiction was not established.
It follows from Siskina that a court should not allow service ex juris
where a claim for aMareva injunction is the sole relief sought.42
The Siskina doctrine contains three related elements: two
substantive and one jurisdictional. Of the substantive elements, one is
spatial and the other temporal. The spatial element is that the plaintiff
must possess a substantive cause of action in the territorial jurisdiction of
the court in order to ground aMareva injunction. The temporal element
is that a cause of action must have accrued at the time that a Mareva
3 7 They did so under the Rules of the Supreme Court (Revision) 1965, S.I. 1965/1776, Ord. 11, r.
1(1) [hereinafter Ord. 11, r. 1(1)], which governs service of process out of England and Wales.
38 [1977] 3 All E.R. 803 (C.A.).
39 The case was decided under the English legislation in force when Siskina was decided, the
Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925 (U.K), 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 49, s. 45(1), which
empowered the court to "grant a mandamus or an injunction or appoint a receiver by an
interlocutory order in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient so to do." It
has since been replaced by the Supreme CourtAct 1981, supra note 12, s. 37(1).
40 Siskina, supra note 35 at 254 (and, at 256, on the requirement of a substantive cause of
action, following North London Ry. Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (1883), 11 Q.B.D. 30 at 39-40).
41 See Perry v. Zissis, [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 607 at 616-17 (C.A.) (refusing to appoint a receiver
or to award an injunction restraining the defendants from disposing of their assets in the jurisdiction
until final determination of an action in California). As noted below in Part VI(C), it may be
possible in some cases for the plaintiff to bring an action or seek a declaration in the forum, but
then consent to a stay of proceedings in favour of trial abroad.
42 See also, on this point, Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v. Ahem, [1986] 2 Qd. R. 342
(S.C.) (allowing application to set aside service out because no cause of action was alleged against
the defendants).
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injunction is sought. The two elements, though distinct, are related for
the present purposes, because there is a temporal aspect to the spatial
element: where a Mareva injunction is sought in aid of foreign
proceedings, the spatial element of the Siskina doctrine is engaged. But
so too is the temporal element, because the plaintiff in the domestic
court may argue that, although he does not have an accrued cause of
action in the jurisdiction, he will have one in the near future-once the
foreign court renders judgment.
The third element of the Siskina doctrine is jurisdictional in
nature: the court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant as a
necessary precursor to ordering relief. The most difficult cases involve
service ex juris, in that in order to establish personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, the plaintiff must place his claim within a head Of the
relevant service ex juris rules. As the discussion in Part E, below,
indicates, the personal jurisdiction element has proved to be
controversial.
The Siskina doctrine was followed in a number of cases soon
after it was promulgated,43 and has until recently remained good law in
England.44 Yet, from the moment of its birth, the Siskina doctrine has
been hotly debated and its orthodoxy has been questioned.4S This
43 Associated Newspapers Group PLC. v. Insert Media Ltd., [1988] 1 W.L.R. 509 at 512 (Ch.D.);
Baidani v. Baidani, [1987] 2 F.L.R. 463 at 465 (C.A.); Serge Caudron v. Air Zaire, [1985] I.R. 716
(S.C.) [hereinafter Air Zaire]; James North & Sons Ltd. v. North Cape Textiles Ltd., [1984] 1 W.L.R.
1428 (C.A.) [hereinafter James North]; and Stockier v. Founvays Estates Ltd., [1984] 1 W.L.R. 25 at
26 (Q.B.D.).
44 Zucker v. Tyndall Holdings PLC, [1993] 1 All E.R. 124 (C.A.); and Veracruz Transportation
Inc. v. V.C. Shipping Co. and Den Norske Bank AIS ('The Veracruz I'), [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 353
(C.A.) [hereinafter The Veracruz I] (strongest recent support for the Siskina rule: Mareva injunction
unavailable where no cause of action has yet accrued). See also Siporex Trade s.A. v. Comdel
Commodities Ltd. [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 428 at 436 (Q.B.D. (Comm. Ct.)) [hereinafter Siporex] ("I
take it to be clear law, both in principle and authority, that a Mareva injunction will not be granted
to an applicant who has no cause of action against the defendant at the time of application."); The
P, [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 470 (Q.B.D. (Comm. Ct.)); NCNB Texas National Bank v. Evensong Co.
("The Mikado"), [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 163 (Q.B.D. (Adm. Ct.)) (distinguishing Siskina andPenty v.
Zissis as concerning relief ancillary to a substantive cause of action); Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier,
[1990] 1 Q.B. 202 at 210 (C.A.) [hereinafter Republic of Haiti] (suggesting that the Brussels
Convention has not affected the common law Siskina rule); and Bassatne, supra note 23.
45 D. Wilde, "Jurisdiction to Grant Interlocutory (Mareva) Injunctions" [1993] L.M.C.L.Q.
309. See also L. Collins, "The Legacy of The Siskina" (1992) 108 L.Q.R. 175; "The End of The
Siskina?" (1993) 109 L.Q.R. 342 (discussing Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty
Construction Ltd., [1993] A.C. 334 (H.L.) [hereinafter Channel Tunnel], and arguing that it
establishes a rule that an injunction may be available in England if justice requires it even if the
defendant is outside the jurisdiction and the case is not covered by the Brussels Convention, infra
note 91). For a recent suggestion that Siskina continues to represent good law, without
acknowledging the dispute surrounding the principle set out in that case, see P. Matthews,
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questioning was aided by the promulgation of section 37(1) of the
Supreme Court Act 1981, which seems to have provided the impetus for a
broader interpretation of the courts' power to order an injunction. 46
And indeed, most cases which followed Siskina contended that section
37(1) did not affect the requirement that there be a substantive cause of
action in the jurisdiction to ground a Mareva injunction.47 The courts
have emphasized that the statutory basis to award a Mareva injunction is
narrower than a simple reading would indicate.48
B. The Spatial Element
Although the House of Lords followed Siskina with vigour for
several years,49 lately, the Law Lords' enthusiasm has faded. They first
began to doubt the sweeping terms of Siskina in the context of anti-suit
injunctions, and later, interim measures in support of foreign litigation
or arbitration. In both cases, the needs of litigants embroiled in
transnational litigation have placed a stress on Siskina which it could not
bear.
"Provisional and Protective Measures in England and Ireland at Common Law and Under the
Conventions: A Comparative Survey" (1995) 14 Civ. Just. Q. 190.
46 Certainly, this was the view of Lord Denning M.R., although as the inventor of the Mareva
injunction, perhaps he was not entirely disinterested. See especially Kent, supra note 21 at 41-43
(allowing injunction against disposition of funds in bank account), in which Lord Denning M.R.
suggested that The Siskina, supra note 35 would be decided differently after the promulgation of s.
37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, supra note 12. But Kent was disapproved of by Lord Bridge of
Harwich in Pickering v. Liverpool Daily Post, [1991] 2 A.C. 370 at 420 (H.L.) [hereinafter Liverpool
Daily Post].
47 Steamship Mutual Undenvriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Thakur Shipping Co. Ltd.,
[1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 439n at 440 (C.A.) (interpreting s. 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, supra
note 12, to require a cause of action in respect of which the court may make an order, and
dismissing an application for a Mareva injunction because no cause of action had yet been brought.
Sir John Donaldson M.R. invoked a slippery slope argument, expressing concern that otherwise
there would be no limits upon applications for an injunction): Ninemia Maritime Corp. v. Trave
Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG ('The Niedersachsen), [1984] 1 All E.R. 398 at 401 (Q.B.D
(Comm. Ct.)), aff'd at 413 (C.A.).
48 Channel Tunnel, supra note 45 at 360-61, Lord Mustill; and Sharpe, supra note 9 at 11.1140.
4 9 Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v. South India Shipping Corp. Ltd., [1981]
A.C. 909 at 979 (H.L.), Lord Diplock, and at 994-95, Lord Scarman (arbitration proceedings);
British Ainvays Board v. LakerAinvays Ltd., [1985] A.C. 58 at 81 (H.L.), Lord Diplock [hereinafter
Laker] (anti-suit injunction against continuance of antitrust litigation in the United States refused);
and Liverpool Daily Post, supra note 46.
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1. Anti-suit injunctions
In contrast to the sweeping terms of the Siskina doctrine, at least
one type of injunction is available without the need for a cause of action:
an anti-suit injunction.50 This type of injunction prohibits a party from
commencing or continuing litigation against a particular party or in
respect of a particular cause of action in a specified (usually foreign)
forum. In setting out the jurisdiction of the courts to order anti-suit
injunctions, the Supreme Court of Canada, the House of Lords, and the
Privy Council have claimed broad inherent powers to order injunctions.
These broad claims rest uneasily with the narrow confines of the Siskina
doctrine.
The tide began to turn against Siskina in South Carolina
Insurance Co. v. Assurantie Maatschappij "De Zeven Provincien" N. V. ,51
where the plaintiff sought an anti-suit injunction to restrain a party to
English proceedings from commencing parallel litigation against it in the
United States. Lord Brandon of Oakbrook confirmed that English
courts could grant anti-suit injunctions. He suggested that, although the
statutory authority underlying the High Court's injunction powers may
appear at first blush to be wide, in reality it has been "circumscribed by
judicial authority dating back many years."52 Accordingly, he limited the
scope of the Court's power to grant injunctions to the terms set out in
Siskina, while making an exception for anti-suit injunctions.
Lord Goff of Chieveley took a different view. Although he
concurred in the result, he declined to accept that anti-suit injunctions
should be categorized as an exception to the Siskina doctrine. To the
contrary, anti-suit injunctions revealed the error of Siskina's dogmatic
rule. Lord Goff viewed anti-suit injunctions as but one manifestation of
the courts' broad ability to grant injunctions:
I am reluctant to accept the proposition that the power of the court to grant injunctions is
restricted to certain exclusive categories. That power is unfettered by statute; and it is
impossible to foresee every circumstance in which it may be thought right to make the
50 See Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers.' Compensation Board) (1993),
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 897 at 930, Sopinka J. [hereinafter Amchem] (observing that "[i]n general, an
injunction is a remedy ancillary to a cause of action," but acknowledging that anti-suit injunctions
are an "exception to this"); and S.N.L Airospatiale, supra note 6.
51 [1987] A.C. 24 (H.L.) [hereinafter South Carolina Insurance]. See also Castanho v.Brown &
Root (UK) Ltd, [1981] A.C. 557 at 573 (H.L.), Lord Scarman (doubting the appropriateness of the
Siskina rule).
52 South Carolina Insurance, supra note 51 at 40.
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remedy available.53
Indeed, an anti-suit injunction may issue even in the absence of a
cause of action in the jurisdiction in which the injunction is being sought.
In many cases, an applicant will seek an anti-suit injunction enjoining the
commencement or continuation of litigation abroad precisely to enable
the applicant to continue litigation in the domestic forum, so that there
will be a cause of action in the domestic jurisdiction. There are,
however, instances where an anti-suit injunction has been sought to
prevent litigation from continuing at all,5 4 or where the applicant is
engaged in litigation in a third foreign forum.55
The availability of anti-suit injunctions demonstrates that there is
no requirement that injunctive relief be ancillary to a substantive cause
of action in the jurisdiction: instead, reliance is placed upon a more
amorphous conception of justice and fairness to the parties.56 The
applicant need only demonstrate that it would be "unconscionable" to
allow the other party to pursue litigation in a foreign forum 57 In
Amchem, the leading Canadian case on anti-suit injunctions, Sopinka J.
stated that "in general, an injunction is a remedy ancillary to a cause of
action" but acknowledged that an anti-suit injunction was an exception
to this rule.5 8 As a result, developments in the law of anti-suit
injunctions demonstrate that there is at least one important exception to
the Siskina doctrine, and a rule with such a large exception becomes
immediately suspect.
53 Ibid. at 44.
54 See, for example, Midland Bank PLc v. Laker Airvays Ltd., [1986] 1 Q.B. 689 (C.A.)
(anti-suit injunction restraining continuation of antitrust litigation in the United States).
55 Airbus Industrie v. Pate4 [1996] N.L.O.R. No. 3805 (Eng. C.A.) (31 July 1996) [hereinafter
Airbus Industrie] (anti-suit injunction sought from English court restraining Texas litigation in aid of
Indian litigation).
56 It was initially thought that the theoretical rationale for anti-suit injunctions was that they
protect the jurisdiction of the forum court. However, in South Carolina Insurance, supra note 51 at
41-43, Lord Brandon specifically rejected the suggestion that such injunctions were concerned with
preventing interference with the court's process, as did Lord Goff in S.N. Aerospatiale, supra note 6
at 892-93. The position of the two Law Lords has since been confirmed in Airbus Industrie, supra
note 55.
5 7 As Adrian Briggs as observed, the traditional approach to the award of anti-suit injunctions
raises a host of issues which have largely been overlooked: A. Briggs, "The Unrestrained Reach of
an Anti-Suit Injunction: A Pause for Thought" [1997] L.M.C.L.Q. 90 (identifying choice of law
issues arising out of the equitable right not to be subjected to vexatious or oppressive litigation).
58 Amchem, supra note 50 at 930.
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2. Arbitration
The strict Siskina requirement that there be a substantive cause
of action in the jurisdiction to ground the award of a Mareva injunction
has faced its most severe challenge in the context of international
arbitration.5 9 A domestic court may award injunctive relief in aid of
foreign arbitral awards.60 Moreover, it has long been the law in England
that the court may order an injunction in aid of pending or intended
foreign arbitral proceedings where the court orders a discretionary stay
in favour of arbitration abroad. 61
In Channel Tunnel,6 2 the House of Lords held that an
interlocutory injunction may be ordered in an action subject to a
mandatory stay under the Arbitration Act, 1975,63 even where the
arbitration itself is to take place abroad. During the construction of the
tunnel under the English Channel, a contractual dispute arose between
the owners of the tunnel and the construction consortium. Their
contract provided for reference of disputes to a panel of experts, and
eventually, to arbitration in Brussels. The owners sought an injunction
59 See D.A. Redfern, "Arbitration and the Courts: Interim Measures of Protection-Is the
Tide About to Turn?" (1995) 30 Tex. Int'l LJ. 71; C.E. Pew & R.M. Jarvis, "Pre-Award Attachment
in International Arbitration: The Law in New York" (1990) 7 J. Int'l Arbit. 31; L.F. Ebb, "Flight of
Assets from the Jurisdiction 'In the Twinkling of a Telex': Pre- and Post-Award Conservatory Relief
in International Commercial Arbitrations" (1990) 7 J. Int'l Arbit. 9; D. L. Zicherman, Note, "The
Use of Pre-Judgment Attachments and Temporary Injunctions in International Commercial
Arbitration Proceedings: A Comparative Analysis of the British and American Approaches" (1989)
50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 667; D. Westin & P. Chrocziel, "Interim Relief Awarded by U.S. and German
Courts in Support of Foreign Proceedings" (1990) 28 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 723; D. Shenton & W.
Kuhn, eds. Interim Court Remedies in Support of Arbitration A Country-by-CountiyAnalysis (London:
International Bar Association, 1987); and W.L. Craig, W.W. Park & J. Paulsson, International
Chamber of Commerce Arbitration, 2d ed. (New York: Oceana, 1990) § 27.04.
60 Courts may also award security for costs in international arbitration proceedings, although
they will do so only in "exceptional" circumstances: S.A. Coppe-Lavalin N.V. v. Ken-Ren Chemicals
and Fertilizers Ltd., [1995] 1 A.C. 38 (H.L.). But see Bank Mellat v. Helliniki Techngki &A., [1984]
Q.B. 291 (C.A.) (application for security for costs for foreign arbitration refused). Note, however,
that it is defendants rather than plaintiffs who seek security for costs, whereas it is plaintiffs who
seek Mareva relief. Of course, where there is a counterclaim the strict distinction between plaintiff
and defendant may not be so clear. Also, an injunction may be granted to restrain the disposition of
assets where costs have been awarded on an interlocutory order. Panton (Faith) Property Plan Ltd v.
Hodgetts, [1981] 2 All E.R. 877 (C.A.).
61 Siporex, supra note 44; and The Rena K, [1979] Q.B. 377 (Adm. Ct.).
6 2 Supra note 45, followed in Aiyela, supra note 23 at 375 (recognizing that the Siskina rule was
modified by Channel Tunnel). See generally J. Hill, "Enforcing Arbitration Agreements and
Interim Relief" [1993] LM.C.L.Q. 465.
63 (U.K), 1975, c. 3, s. 1(1).
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restraining the consortium from suspending work on the tunnel pending
the arbitration. The House of Lords held that an injunction could be
awarded despite the existence of the mandatory stay of proceedings in
favour of arbitration abroad. Having set out the jurisdiction to order
injunctive relief, however, the Law Lords declined to do so on the facts.
Channel Tunnel indicates that, although a substantive cause of
action may be a necessary precursor to an interlocutory injunction, 64 the
cause of action need not be within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
in which interlocutory relief is sought.6s In this way, a domestic court
can order interlocutory relief in aid of foreign judicial or arbitral
proceedings. However, the dispute must be potentially justiciable by the
domestic court in order for the court to order interim relief, even if, in
practical terms, the order of a stay will be virtually automatic.66
Channel Tunnel thus draws into question The Siskina's
requirement that the plaintiff must rely upon a substantive cause of
action in order to ground ancillary relief in the form of a Mareva
injunction, at least to the extent that the cause of action must be one
located within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. However, Channel
Tunnel did not challenge the requirement that a cause of action must
have accrued, or that the defendant be amenable to the personal
jurisdiction of the court in order for Mareva relief to be ordered.
In a similar vein, in Phonogram Ltd. v. DefAmerican Inc.,67 the
High Court held that an interlocutory injunction was available in.
England where domestic proceedings had been stayed in favour of
California proceedings. Although the case concerned foreign litigation
rather than arbitration proceedings, the court followed Channel Tunnel
in holding that it possessed the authority to grant interlocutory
injunctive relief where the relevant causes of action were within the
territorial jurisdiction of the English court, even though the court
ordered a stay of proceedings in favour of litigation abroad on forum non
conveniens grounds.
However, the court held that it would be appropriate to order an
injunction in aid of foreign legal proceedings only in unusual
circumstances. In particular, it would be reluctant to make an order
64 Qingdao Ocean Shipping Co. v. Grace Shipping Establishment ("The Xing Su Hal"), [1995] 2
LI. R. 15 at 25 (Q.B.D. (Comm. CL)) [hereinafter The Xing Su Hai].
65 Channel Tunnel, supra note 45 at 342-43, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, and at 362, Lord Mustill.
66 Sharpe, supra note 9 at 1 1.1170 (suggesting that the cases establish that "It]he jurisdiction
of the courts to grant injunctions is limited only by the principle that the suit in which injunctive
relief is claimed must raise ajusticiable issue between the parties")
67 (1994) T.L.R. 493 (Ch.D.) [hereinafter DefAmerican].
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which might pre-empt a ruling of a foreign court. The foreign court
might make its own Mareva-type order. If the foreign court did not have
the power to make such an order, the English court would "be likely to
refuse the relief sought on the ground that the applicant was guilty of
'forum shopping.' Where foreign and domestic proceedings continue
simultaneously, the fact that the foreign court has already made a
restraining order is merely one factor to be considered in the domestic
court's determination as to whether to order a Mareva injunction: it is
not determinative. 68
The British Columbia Supreme Court did not express such
reservations about the award of provisional relief in aid of foreign
arbitration proceedings in Trade Fortune Inc. v. Amalgamated Mill
Supplies Ltd.69 A charter-party agreement contained a clause providing
for arbitration of disputes in London, and for English law to govern. A
dispute arose, and the arbitration process was commenced. Before the
arbitration was complete, the plaintiff brought an action in British
Columbia seeking a pre-judgment garnishing order. The defendant
sought to have the garnishing order set aside, and also sought a stay of
proceedings pending the outcome of the arbitration in London. The
court held that under provincial legislation it could award a garnishing
order as an "interim measure of protection" pending arbitration in
London to secure funds for payment of an eventual arbitration award.70
The court further held that its ability to award such an interim measure
was unaffected by the statutory requirement that it order a stay in favour
of arbitration in London.71 The dispute remained justiciable in British
Columbia despite the mandatory stay.
There are limits upon the courts' willingness to award Mareva
relief in aid of foreign arbitral proceedings. In Rosseel N.v. v. Oriental
Commercial Shipping (U.K) Ltd.,72 the English Court of Appeal declined
to award a worldwide Mareva injunction in aid of a New York arbitral
award. The court was prepared to order a Mareva injunction in aid of
foreign arbitral proceedings with respect to assets within its own
jurisdiction, but held that it should be very reluctant to make an order
that would have the effect of extending outside its jurisdiction, and
68 See Felixstowe Dock & Railway Co. v. United States Lines Inc., [1989] 1 Q.B. 360 (Mareva
injunction continued despite foreign bankruptcy proceedings).
69 (1994), 89 B.C.L.R. (2d) 132 (S.C.) [hereinafter Trade Fortune].
70 International CommercialArbitration Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 233, s. 9.
71 jl., s. 8.
72 [1990] 1 W.LR. 1387 [hereinafter Oriental Commercial].
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would do so only in a very exceptional case.7 3 Lord Donaldson M.R.
noted that, if worldwide Mareva injunctions were to be made in aid of
foreign proceedings, the result might well be "criss-crossing long arm
jurisdictional orders with a high degree of probability that there would
be confusion and, indeed, resentment by the nations concerned at
interference with their jurisdictions." 74 Note, of course, that it was
worldwide Mareva relief being sought, so that concerns of comity
weighed heavily.
C. The Temporal Element
The Law Lords in Siskina were understandably concerned that
injunctive relief should not be available in the abstract, without a basis in
an underlying legal dispute justiciable in the English courts.
Accordingly, they made it a condition of granting a Mareva injunction
that a cause of action must have arisen at the time that relief was sought.
Yet the requirement that a cause of action must have already arisen
before injunctive relief can be granted denies relief to plaintiffs with
deserving cases. The rigidity of the Siskina doctrine has, at times, led
lower courts to construct devices to avoid it where its application would
produce injustice.
In A. v. B., the English Commercial Court held that a Mareva
injunction was available even where no subsisting cause of action had yet
arisen.7 5 The court made the award of a Mareva injunction conditional
upon the delivery of a vessel, at which point the plaintiff's cause of
action-which did not yet exist-would arise. The English courts have
also been willing to order Mareva injunctions in the absence of a
pre-existing cause of action where statutory language authorizes doing
so.76 However, the current rule in England is that the temporal element
73 Presumably, similar reluctance would apply to an order in favour of legal proceedings in
another contracting state: see ibid. at 1389 (describing Republic of Haiti, supra note 44, as "very
unusual").
74 Supra note 72 at 1389.
75 [1989] 2 Q.B. 423.
76 See In Re Oriental Credit Ltd., [1988] 1 Ch. 204 (injunction granted under Companies Act
1985 (U.K.), 1985, c. 6, s. 561, to restrain company director from leaving the jurisdiction to avoid
attending an examination even where there was no subsisting cause of action). See also Insolvency
Act 1986 (U.K.), 1986, c. 45, s. 423 (fraudulent conveyance provisions apply regardless of whether a
cause of action has yet accrued), discussed in C.F. Forsyth, "Interlocutory Injunctions Where There
is No Legal or Equitable Right to be Protected" [1988] Camb. L.J. 177.
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of Siskina remains very much in force. Thus, in The Veracruz 1,77 the
Court of Appeal declined to award a Mareva injunction in anticipation of
a breach of contract and, in a decision released mere days before the
Privy Council's decision in Mercedes-Benz, the Court of Appeal again
confirmed that a Mareva injunction is unavailable where a cause of
action had not yet arisen.78
Despite the apparent approval of the temporal branch of the
Siskina doctrine, the current status of the English rule remains
somewhat murky. This is so because, even though the Court of Appeal
has genuflected to the rule, it has determined that an injunction is
available even in an action for a declaration. The lower courts have
followed The VeracruzI and Siskina in holding that the power to grant an
injunction must be based on a cause of action, but have gone on to hold
that a declaration of right amounts to a cause of action for the purpose
of ordering an injunction, and ordered an injunction on this basis.79 If a
mere declaratory judgment can serve as a cause of action sufficient to
ground interim relief, then the temporal branch of the Siskina doctrine
appears to be weak and easily circumvented.
Paul Marshall argues convincingly that the temporal branch of
the Siskina rule misses the main point, namely that, in order to obtain a
Mareva injunction, the plaintiff must cross the threshold of showing a
"good arguable case," which in his view "renders the distinction between
an accrued cause of action and a cause of action which will, for all
practical purposes, inevitably accrue, unnecessary ... .,"80 Marshall's
argument bears emphasizing: the threshold for obtaining Mareva relief is
high,8 1 so that theoretical niceties as to whether or not a cause of action
has yet arisen will almost invariably pale in the light of evidence of
conduct verging on fraud on the part of a defendant.
This logic has largely been accepted by the Australian courts,
which have adopted a broader approach to the temporal element than
77 Supra note 44.
78 Department of Social Services v. Butler, [1995] 4 All E.R. 193 (C.A.) [hereinafter Butler]
(Mareva injunction unavailable to prevent alleged disposition of assets where no finding of child
support liability under statutory framework had yet been made).
79 Newport Association Football Club Ltd. v. Football Association of Wales Ltd., [1995] 2 All
E.R. 87 (Ch.D.); and Re S. (Hospital Patient: Court's Jurisdiction), [1995] Fain. 26 (injunction
ordered despite absence of cause of action).
80 P. Marshall, "The Conditional or Anticipatory Mareva Injunction" [1992] L.M.C.L.Q. 161
at 168; see also Skene, supra note 8 at 34-36.
81 Sharpe, supra note 9 at 2.870 (Mareva injunction should be refused unless "there is a good
prospect of success at trial"); and see cases noted supra note 20.
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that contemplated by Siskina.8 2 In part, this may be due to a more
explicit recognition that the purpose of the Mareva injunction is to
prevent an abuse of the process of the court in relation to the
(anticipated) exercise of its powers. 83 Thus, in Deputy Commissioner of
Taxation v. Sharp,84 a Mareva injunction was awarded where no cause of
action had yet arisen. The revenue authorities had demonstrated that
the defendants were likely to remove their assets to frustrate tax
assessments against them, even though the assessments had not yet
crystallized into causes of action because the relevant payment deadlines
had not yet expired. The Court suggested that Lord Diplock's
formulation of the rule in Siskina-requiring an accrued cause of
action-was too narrow, and that a better approach was that "a Mareva
injunction may be made where there is a real risk that a debtor may deal
with his or her assets before judgment against him or her so as to stultify
that judgment when obtained."8s The Australian decisions suggest that
a strict interpretation of Siskina's temporal element may work
injustice.8 6
Recent English decisions concerning the impact of Mareva
injunctions on third parties and co-defendants indicate a certain degree
of flexibility with regard to Siskina's accrued cause of action
requirement. In each case, a Mareva injunction was ordered against a
related party even though a cause of action technically did not lie against
it, due to evidence that it held assets beneficially which could be
82 M.J. Tilbury, Civil Remedies: Volume One: Principles of Civil Remedies (Sydney:
Butterworths, 1990) at 334-35; and R.P. Meager, W.M.C. Gummow & J.R.F. Lehane, Equity
Doctrines and Remedies, 3d ed. (Sydney: Butterworths, 1992) at 605-14 (critical of the juridical basis
for Mareva injunctions, although acknowledging their development). But see I.C.F. Spry, The
Principles of Equitable Remedies, 4th ed. (Sydney: Law Book, 1990) at 504-23.
8 3 Jackson v. Sterling Industries Ltd. (1987), 162 C.L.R. 612 at 619 (Aust. H.C.), Wilson and
Dawson JJ., and at 623, Deane J. A similar approach has been adopted in some Canadian courts:
Mooney, supra note 24 at 49; Standal Estate v. Swecan International Ltd., [1990] 1 F.C. 115 at 134-35
(C.A.) [hereinafter Standal Estate]; and Reading & Bates Horizontal Drilling Co. v. Spie (1986), 13
C.P.R. (3d) 37 at 42 (F.C.T.D.).
84 (1988), 82 A.C.T.R. 1 (S.C.) [hereinafter D.C. Taxation].
85 Ibid., para. 23.
86 See also Patterson V. BTR Engineering (Aust) Ltd. (1989), 18 N.S.W.L.R. 319 at 329 (C.A.),
Rogers A.-J.A. ("in some circumstances ... the justice of the case may require that injunctive relief
be granted even before the cause of action arises"), and at 331 ("Ultimately, what the plaintiff has
to show is that the defendant, by attempting to put his assets out of reach, is seeking to frustrate the
court's power to grant an effective remedy."); and Construction Engineering (Aust) Py Ltd v. Tambel
(Australasia) Ply Ltd. (1984), 1 N.S.W.L.R. 274 (S.C.) (court may award Mareva injunction in aid of
pending arbitration proceeding).
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attributed to the defendant, against whom a cause of action did lie.8 7 It
is probably accurate to say that these cases cannot be reconciled with
Siskina: they illustrate the rigidity of that doctrine and suggest that it
would be better for the courts to base the principles upon which they will
order Mareva injunctions upon a different foundation.8
The question as to whether a Mareva injunction should be
available where there is no cause of action at all need not be resolved
here. The floodgates arguments underlying the reasoning in Siskina do
have some force, and it is difficult to conceive of an injunction being
sought without reference to any cause of action anywhere.8 9 But in the
circumstances under discussion-where a Mareva injunction is sought in
aid of foreign proceedings-there is a cause of action: the only
complicating factor is that it is being adjudicated abroad. I also argue
that a Mareva injunction should be ordered in aid of foreign proceedings
even where those proceedings have not commenced, so long as an
undertaking is given to commence them as soon as possible, and in any
event, within a set time limit.
D. Interim Relief In Aid of Foreign Proceedings Under the
Brussels and Lugano Conventions9O
Siskina's bar to the ability of English courts to order Mareva
injunctions in aid of foreign legal proceedings was partially removed by
the reception of the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
8 7 SeeAiyela, supra note 23 (Mareva injunction upheld against defendant's wife); Aiglon Ltd.
v. Gau Shan Co. Ltd., f1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 164 (continuation of a Mareva injunction ordered
against company against which no cause of action lay which held assets "stripped" from named shell
defendant); and Ts.B. Private Bank Int'l S.A.v. Chabra, [1992] 1 W.L.R. 231 (Ch. D.) (A cause of
action lay against one defendant, the majority shareholder of the second corporate defendant,
which held most of his assets. A Mareva injunction was ordered against the second defendant
against whom no cause of action lay, on the reasoning that the injunction was ancillary to the
plaintiff's cause of action against the first defendant.). See also Verekerv. Choi, [1985] 4 N.S.W.L.R.
277 (S.C.) (Mareva injunction awarded against wife of defendant who was otherwise not party to
action).
88 See Skene, supra note 8 at 36-37.
89 See, for example, problems along the lines of Gourietv. Union of Post Office Workers, [1978]
A.C. 435 (H.L.). See Butler, supra note 78 (Mareva injunction restraining disposition of assets
against individual against whom a maintenance order had been made under statute where there was
no underlying cause of action).
90 On which see Matthews, supra note 45: A. Briggs & P. Rees, Norton Rose on Civil
Jurisdiction and Judgments, 2d ed. (London: Lloyd's, 1997); and G. Hogan, "The Judgments
Convention and Mareva Injunctions in the United Kingdom and Ireland" (1989) 14 Eur. L. Rev.
191.
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Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters into English law.91 That
incorporation renders Siskina inapplicable where interim relief is sought
in aid of legal proceedings in a Contracting State.92 Proceedings must
have been brought (or be about to be brought93) in a Contracting State,
the defendant must be domiciled in a Contracting State,94 and the
subject matter of the litigation must be within the scope of the
Conventions (i.e., civil and commercial matters). In awarding interim
relief in aid of foreign proceedings, English courts do not exercise
substantive jurisdiction over the dispute: they exercise jurisdiction for
the limited purpose of granting provisional measures. 95
In a celebrated case, the English Court of Appeal upheld
injunctive relief restraining the disposition of assets in aid of French
proceedings seeking recovery of assets from the family of deposed
Haitian president Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier. 96 Similarly, a
Mareva injunction was ordered in aid of French proceedings against a
defendant domiciled in Saudi Arabia. 97 Likewise, a plaintiff pursuing an
action in Ireland against a defendant domiciled in a Convention State
was awarded a "worldwide" Mareva injunction in aid of the Irish
proceedings.9 8
91 27 September 1968, (1969) 8 I.L.M. 229 (entered into force 1 February 1973) [hereinafter
Brussels Convention]. The Brussels Convention was incorporated into domestic law in the United
Kingdom by the Civil Jurisdiction and JudgmentsAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 27 [hereinafter CJJA 1982],
in force 1 January 1987. A parallel Convention concluded with the Contracting States to the
Brussels Convention and the Member States of the European Free Trade Area, the Lugano
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 16
September 1988, (1989) 28 I.L.M. 620 [hereinafterLugano Convention], was incorporated into U.K.
domestic law by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1991 (U.K.), 1991, c. 12. Canada is not a
party to either the Brussels orLugano Conventions.
92 "Contracting states" are those states which are parties to the Brussels or Lugano
Conventions. The CIJA 1982, supra note 91, ss. 24, 25, gives courts the power to order interim relief,
but do not require its exercise, as s. 25(2) provides that such measures as are allowed by national law
may be applied at the court's discretion. Section 25(3) allows the power to be extended by an order
in council so as to apply to other states, although this has not been done.
93 Alltrans Inc. v. Interdom Holdings Ltd., [1991] 4 All E.R. 458 (C.A.) (Mareva injunction in
favour of Dutch proceedings under the Brussels Convention).
94 Although, seeX. v. Y, [1990] 1 Q.B. 220.
95 See Neste Chemicals s.. v. DK Line si4. ('The Sargasso'), [1994] 3 All E.R. 180 at 187
(C.A.); and Balkanbank v. Taher, [1995] 2 All E.R. 904 at 920 (C.A.) [hereinafter Balkanbank]
(party which invokes the interim relief jurisdiction may be considered to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the English courts for the purposes of a counterclaim against it).
96 Republic of Haiti, supra note 44.
97 X v. Y, supra note 94.
98 Balkanbank, supra note 95.
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The Convention experience demonstrates that, with a system of
international reciprocity in the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments and orders in place, some provision must be made for courts
to make provisional and protective orders in aid of proceedings in other
Convention States. Yet the Convention jurisprudence might also suggest
that the relaxation of the traditional limitations upon the ability of
domestic courts to order provisional and protective measures in aid of
foreign proceedings is feasible only where there is a treaty-based
international set of rules governing the exercise of jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. In a recent Ontario
case, Farley J. suggested that the ease of travel and transfer of assets
between jurisdictions has created a need for legislation in Canadian
provinces akin to article 25 of the Brussels/Lugano Conventions.99
In my view, the argument that a treaty-based system for the
allocation of jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments is a
necessary precursor to the extension of the courts' ability to award
Mareva relief does not withstand scrutiny. Even though Canada is not a
party to any multilateral conventions analogous in scope to the
Brussels/Lugano Conventions, recent years have seen a reformation of
many elements of Canadian private international law by the Supreme
Court of Canada. This process indicates avenues by which Canadian
courts, properly informed, may order Mareva injunctions in aid of
foreign proceedings, even in the absence of a multilateral convention
enabling (or even binding) them to do so. Indeed, the English
experience with the award of interim measures in aid of litigation in
other Contracting States leads one to ask why the English courts (or any
other common law courts, for that matter) could not order such
measures on the basis of properly developed common law rules.
E. Personal Jurisdiction, Due Process, Justiciability, and
the Real and Substantial Connection Requirement
The third element of the Siskina doctrine is the requirement of
personal jurisdiction. To order a Mareva injunction, the court must
exercise proper personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The concern
that there be a close relationship between subject matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction has always animated the English courts/00 and
there is growing recognition of the importance of this relationship in
9 9 Baurv. Nelvana Ltd, [1991] O.J. No. 2364, paras. 53-55 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) (QL).
100 See, for example, Roster v. Hilbery, [1925] Ch. 250 (C.A.).
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Canadian courts. Where the defendant is present in the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, or has submitted to the court's jurisdiction, no
problem of personal jurisdiction arises.101 Where the defendant is
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, matters are more
complicated, because the defendant has a reasonable expectation that
process will be served upon her only in carefully defined
circumstances. 102
Most Canadian common law provinces permit the plaintiff in an
action to serve process ex juris without leave of the court. In Ontario, a
plaintiff must place his case under a head of Rule 17.02 in order to serve
a defendant exjuris.0 3 On one level, then, the question as to whether a
plaintiff seeking an injunction may serve originating process upon a
defendant who is outside the territorial jurisdiction is to be answered
merely by determining whether the claim can be placed within the
language of Rule 17.02(i):
A party to a proceeding may, without a court order, be served outside Ontario with an
originating process or notice of a reference where the proceeding against the party
consists of a claim or claims, ...
(i) for an injunction ordering a party to do, or refrain from doing, anything in Ontario or
affecting real or personal property in Ontario.
The language of the rule is, however, ambiguous. Canadian
authority suggests that service exjuris should be set aside where a Mareva
injunction is the sole relief sought.104 It seems that provincial service ex
juris rules will be governed by the requirement that there must be a real
and substantial connection between the claim and the province.10 5 Rule
101 Moran v. Pyle National (Canada) Ltd., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393 at 397 [hereinafter Moran v.
Pyle]. The traditional rule that mere transitory presence in the jurisdiction suffices to establish
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, as exemplified by Maharanee of Baroda v. Wildenstein,
[1972] 2 Q.B. 283 (C.A.) may go too far, in that it may be transgress inchoate constitutional limits of
a due process variety, but I need not address this point here.
102 See Schiffahrtsgesellschaft Detlev von Appen GmbH v. Voest Alpine Intertrading, [1997] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 179 at 185 (Q.B.D. (Comm. Ct.)).
103 Otherwise, a plaintiff must seek leave of the court under r. 17.03. Analogous provisions
allowing service out where an injunction is sought exist in all other Canadian common law
provinces.
104 Suncorp Realty Inc. v. PLN Investments (1986), 36 Man. R. (2d) 280 (Q.B.) [hereinafter
Suncorp Realty]. No cases have interpreted r. 17.02(i) of the Ontario Rules, supra note 28, or its
Alberta or British Columbia counterparts. See Alberta Rules of Court, Alta. Reg. 390/68, r. 30(i);
and B.C. Rules of Court, 1990, B.C. Reg. 221/90, r. 13(1)(i).
105 This doctrine was set out in Motguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077
[hereinafterMorguard]. See MacDonald v. Lasnier (1994), 21 O.R. (3d) 177 (Gen. Div.); Frymer v.
Brettschneider (1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 60 at 74-75 (C.A.), Weiler J.A. (dissenting) [hereinafter Frymer];
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17.02 and its counterparts in other common law provinces merely
enumerate particular instances of a "real and substantial connection,"
the test set out in Morguard.10 6
On a more general level, Canadian courts have properly
expressed concern that defendants outside the jurisdiction not be
subjected to litigation in Canada, where there is no real and substantial
connection between the underlying dispute and this country.107 So, for
example, in Elesguro Inc. v. Ssangyong Shipping Co.,1O8 leave to serve e
juris for a Mareva injunction to freeze a ship in Canada was refused
where neither the parties nor the ship had any connection with Canada.
And in Canadian Pioneer Petroleums Inc. v. F.D.I.C.,109 a similar concern
that an injunction not be awarded where the underlying dispute was
properly addressed in a foreign forum was evident. These cases
emphasize the requirement that, for a Canadian court to take subject
matter jurisdiction over a dispute, there must be a real and substantial
connection between the dispute and the court (or more properly, with
the territorial jurisdiction in which the court is located).110
Although, as noted above, the presence of the defendant's assets
in the territorial jurisdiction of the court does not establish personal
jurisdiction over an absentee defendant for the purpose of allowing the
court to adjudicate a substantive claim, the presence of assets does have
an important practical consequence. The courts' willingness to impose
injunctive relief is conditioned by an appreciation of the concern that
such orders be effective because enforceable against the defendant.
There is no theoretical reason preventing a court from taking personal
jurisdiction over a defendant who is outside its jurisdiction.111 The
and Wilson v.Moyes (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 202 (Gen. Div.).
106 Moiguard, supra note 105. See Fiymer, supra note 105 at 65 and 74-75.
107 See Northern Sales Co. v. Government Trading Corp. of Iran (1991), 48 C.P.C. (2d) 254 at
259 (B.C.C.A.). See also Sharpe, supra note 9 at 1.1250 ("'Were such an injunction allowed in the
absence of a cause justiciable in the domestic court, its practical effect would often be to force the
foreigner to come to the jurisdiction to defend an action ordinarily justiciable in a foreign court only
to protect or obtain release of his or her assets.")
108 [1981] 2 F.C. 326 (T.D.). Rule 307(1) of the Federal Court Rules, supra note 13, requires
leave of the court to serve process exjuris.
109 (1984), 30 Sask. R. 315 at 319 (Q.B.), on appeal (1984), 34 Sask. R. 51 (C.A.).
110 See Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022 at 1049, La Forest J.
111 Other than certain due process concerns which, though of central importance in the
United States, have not as yet played a role in Canada. See P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of
Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) (updated to 1996), para. 13.5(b). Certainly, public
international law does not require a connection between the parties to a dispute and the forum for
protective measures to be invoked: C. McLachlan, "Transnational Applications of Mareva
Injunctions and Anton Piller Orders" (1987) 36 I.C.L.Q. 669; F.A. Mann, 'The Doctrine of
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
presence of the defendant's assets in the jurisdiction affects not the
court's subject-matter jurisdiction, but rather, by increasing the
likelihood that the order will be enforceable against the defendant, it
influences the exercise of the court's discretion as to whether to exercise
this subject-matter jurisdiction over the defendant.
For personal jurisdiction purposes, there is an important
distinction between Mareva injunctions, which are provisional and
protective in nature, and substantive forms of relief. It would obviously
be inappropriate for a Canadian court to order an interlocutory
injunction against a person who had no real and substantial connection
to the court. This would represent the vindication of the worst type of
forum shopping.112 But where the injunctive relief sought is both
protective in nature and anticipates that a foreign judgment or award
will be secured and subsequently registered or enforced in Canada, any
unfairness to the defendant melts away. Jurisdiction to freeze ssets is
not premised on possession of jurisdiction to determine the substantive
merits of the dispute, and there is accordingly no reason why the same
standard of personal jurisdiction should apply in both instances.) 3
This conclusion is reinforced by reference to the American
experience with provisional relief in aid of arbitration. The availability
of attachment in the United States in aid of foreign arbitration
proceedings is a matter of some uncertainty. One line of authority,
exemplified by McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT,1 14 denies it on the
premise that such attachment is inconsistent with arbitration. The
converse position was taken in Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex,115
where a federal district court upheld the attachment of assets in
California pending the resolution of arbitration in New York. The
defendant's connections to California were minimal-indeed, too
minimal to support the assertion of personal jurisdiction over it under
the International Shoe Co. v. Washington 16 standard for the purpose of
exercising substantive jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute.
International Jurisdiction Revisited After Twenty Years" (1984) 186 Hague Recueil des Cours 9 at
73; and L. Collins, "Provisional Measures, the Conflict of Laws and the Brussels Convention"
(1981) 1 Y.B. Eur. L 263 [hereinafter "Provisional Measures"].
112 But see Airbus Industrie, supra note 55.
113 A. Briggs, "How Soon is an English Court Seised (Revisited)?" [1994] L.M.C.L.Q. 470 at
472 ("It is now clear that jurisdiction to grant provisional or protective measures bears no necessary
or uniform connection to jurisdiction to hear the action on the underlying merits.")
114 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 1974) [hereinafter McCreay].
115 451 F.Supp. 1045 (N.D. Calif. 1977) [hereinafter Uranex].
116 326 U.S. 310 (1945) [hereinafter International Shoe].
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Moreover, Uranex was decided soon after Shaffer,117 which had extended
the in personam "minimum contacts" requirement of International Shoe
to the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction.
The Uranex court noted that the United States Supreme Court,
in Shaffer, had been careful to leave open an exception to the general
rule governing personal jurisdiction enunciated in that case, so that
attachment of assets in one jurisdiction could be ordered pending
resolution of litigation or arbitration elsewhere, despite the fact that the
defendant's contacts with the attaching forum were inadequate to
establish substantive jurisdiction there. In so holding, the Uranex court
was explicitly motivated by the concern that courts must not be
powerless to prevent an abuse of process, and must ensure that litigants
cannot render themselves judgment proof after the writ is served.118
The inconsistency between McCreary and Uranex has yet to be ironed
out: McCreary has received some subsequent support,11 9 although most
courtsl 20 and commentators1 21 prefer Uranex.
It should be recalled that a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign
proceedings does nothing more than freeze the defendant's assets. It
does not condemn them for judicial sale or otherwise affect title to
117 Supra note 32.
118 Uranex, supra note 115 at 1048.
119 See Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, 442 N.E.2d 1239 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1982); J.T.A.D.
Assoc., Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1981); and Metro World Tanker v. P.N. Pertanbangar,
427 F.Supp. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also Drexel Burnham Lambert v. Ruebsamen, 531 N.Y.S.2d 547
(App. Div. 1st Dept. 1988) (following McCreary in denying attachment order against Germans
where plaintiff anticipated winning arbitration award against them).
120 See, for example, Rogers, Burgun, Shahine & Deschler, Inc. v. Dongsan Constr. Co., 598 F.
Supp. 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (ordering preliminary injunction to prevent defendant from disposing of
assets while ordering a stay of proceedings in favour of arbitration in Paris); Roso-Lino Beverage
Distributors Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 749 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1984) (decision to refer dispute to
arbitration does not strip court of power to grant injunctive relief); Borden Inc. v. Meiji Milk
Products Co.., 919 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 953 (1991) (upholding preliminary
injunctive relief in aid of arbitration while dismissing action on grounds of forum non conveniens in
favour of foreign proceedings); and Blumenthal v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 910
F.2d 1049 (2d Cir. 1990), on remand, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8555 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). See also
Performance Unlimited Inc. v. Questar Publishers Inc., 52 F.3d 1373 (6th Cir. 1995), rehearing, en
banc, denied, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 25049 (6th Cir. 1995) (court can grant injunctive relief in an
arbitrable dispute pending arbitration); Matrenord, S.S. v. Zokor International Ltd., 1984 No. 84 C
1639 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (pre-arbitration attachment not inconsistent with New York Convention);
• A.S.T., Inc. v. MIVAlaia, 876 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir.) (declining to follow McCreary in the admiralty
context); and Cameco Industries v.Mayatrac, S.A., 789 F.Supp. 200 at 204 n. 5 (D. Md. 1992)
[hereinafter Cameco Industries].
121 Schlosser, supra note 2 at 162-63; C.N. Brower & W.M. Tupman, "Court-Ordered
Provisional Measures Under the New York Convention" (1986) 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 24 at 31; and
Scoles & Hay, supra note 30 at 244.
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property. Moreover, there is no question of the domestic court taking
personal jurisdiction over an individual merely on the basis of the
presence of his or her assets within the jurisdiction. Finally, the plaintiff
must still satisfy the normal requirements of a Mareva injunction, and
they are onerous, as Friedland No. 5 122 demonstrated.
III. MERCEDES-BENZ AG V.LEIDUCK
As the preceding Parts demonstrate, the three elements of the
Siskina doctrine each have been subjected to attack and subversion.
They were ripe for reappraisal. In 1995, the Privy Council was presented
with an opportunity to revisit Siskina head-on. Regrettably, the majority
shied away from the challenge, although a spirited dissent by Lord
Nicholls showed the way forward.
A. Facts
In Mercedes-Benz,123 a German auto manufacturer entered into a
contract with Leiduck, a German citizen, and a Monaco corporation
(IRsAM) controlled by him, to promote the sale of automobiles to a
customer in Russia. To finance this scheme, Mercedes-Benz advanced
(us) twenty million dollars to IRSAM, secured by a promissory note from,
and guaranteed by, Leiduck. IRSAM defaulted on the promissory note, as
did Leiduck on the guarantee. Mercedes-Benz argued that the funds it
had advanced to IRSAM had been misappropriated in favour of ICR, a
Hong Kong company controlled by Leiduck.
Mercedes-Benz brought a civil action in Monaco against Leiduck
to recover the funds. Leiduck was also made the subject of criminal
proceedings in Monaco, and was placed in police custody there.
Meantime, Mercedes-Benz became concerned that Leiduck was
attempting to transfer assets out of Hong Kong, and brought an action in
the Supreme Court of Hong Kong against Leiduck and ICR.
Mercedes-Benz argued that, although the Monaco proceedings, then
still in progress, would likely end in its favour, and that the resulting
judgment could be enforced in Hong Kong under bilateral arrangements
for the reciprocal enforcement of judgments between France and Hong
Kong, for practical purposes it would be unable to enforce the Monaco
122 Supra note 5.
123 Supra note 7.
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judgment in Hong Kong because the defendants were spiriting their
assets out of Hong Kong in the interim, so as to render themselves
effectively judgment proof.
The Hong Kong action against ICR was subsequently abandoned,
but the action against Leiduck continued. Mercedes-Benz sought
injunctive relief, and several interim orders were made against Leiduck.
After an initial delay, Leiduck brought applications to have all of the
orders against him set aside. The applications setting aside the orders
were allowed at trial1 24 and affirmed on appeal.l 2S Mercedes-Benz then
brought a further appeal to the Privy Council. At the time of that
hearing, judgment had not yet been reached in the Monaco action, but
was anticipated within hours.
Two issues arose before the Privy Council. The first was one of
personal jurisdiction: whether the Court should grant leave to serve
process ex juris under the Hong Kong rules (the relevant Hong Kong
rule being identical to the English Ord. 11, r. l(1)(b))126 upon the
defendant Leiduck in Monaco. Could the court grant leave to serve out
on a foreigner not present in the forum, and whose only connection to
the forum was that he possessed assets there? The second and related
question concerned the substantive jurisdiction of the court to award the
Mareva relief being sought. Was a Mareva injunction available in the
forum in a case where the defendant was not present, and where there
was no substantive cause of action in the forum, given that the Mareva
injunction sought was ancillary to foreign, rather than domestic, legal
proceedings?
B. Lord Mustill's Majority Speech
Lord Mustill, joined by Lords Goff, Slynn of Hadley, and
Hoffmann, began by examining the question of personal jurisdiction, on
the basis that if that question should be answered in the negative, the
substantive question would not arise. Leiduck was a foreigner, and was
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. Mercedes-Benz had no
cause of action against him in Hong Kong, and he had no connection to
Hong Kong, other than the assets he possessed there. Personal
jurisdiction over the defendant had to be established by service. As the
124 [1994] 3 H.K.C. 216 (S.C.).
125 [1995] 1 H.K.C. 448 (C.A.).
126 Supra note 37.
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defendant was outside the jurisdiction, the plaintiff had to place its
application for service out within a head of Ord. 11 to be entitled to seek
leave of the court to have the writ served on the defendant:
R. 1(1) ... service of a writ out of the jurisdiction is permissible with the leave of the Court
if in the action begun by the writ-
(b) an injunction is sought ordering the defendant to do or refrain from doing anything
within the jurisdiction ...127
Could an application for a Mareva injunction be placed into this
category where no permanent relief was sought because no .cause of
action had been brought in the jurisdiction? Lord Mustill held that a
facial reading of the statutory provision proved insufficient for a proper
interpretation. Accordingly, the issue of personal jurisdiction could be
resolved only by engaging in an examination of the juridical basis for a
Mareva injunction.128
The first possibility was that, despite its name, a Mareva
injunction is not really an injunction at all, but instead a form of
pre-judgment attachment. As Lord Mustill noted, while this view had
some initial support in the case law, it could not be sustained. A Mareva
injunction operates in personam, not in rem: it creates no proprietary
rights, and more importantly, does not serve as a source of
subject-matter jurisdiction over the defendant. Further, refutation of
the attachment thesis came from the observation that, although initially
Mareva injunctions were available only against foreigners who were
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the forum court, this requirement
was later abandoned, so that Mareva injunctions could be ordered
against defendants without regard to their nationality.
The second possibility, derived from the Mareva case itself,129
was that an injunction could issue where a plaintiff had a right to be paid
a debt owing to him, even where he had yet to establish this right by
obtaining a judgment for it. This possible explanation had been
advanced in an effort to distinguish an earlier line of cases that had been
hostile to pre-judgment injunctive relief. Yet, Siskina and other cases
indicated that the earlier line of authority was in fact correct on this
127I.
128 Mercedes-Benz, supra note 7 at 299 ("The first step would be to ascertain not only what a
Mareva injunction does, but also how, juristically speaking, it does it. This should be straightforward
but is not.")
12 9 Supra note 14.
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point.I30 Lord Mustill concluded that this explanation of the juridical
source of the Mareva injunction was inadequate.
Having dismissed these two possible explanations, Lord Mustill
concluded that the only remaining explanation was that the Mareva
injunction, like an anti-suit injunction, was sui generis. Given this, Lord
Mustill considered it misleading to suggest that, solely because a Mareva
injunction is called an "injunction," it should automatically fall within
the category delineated by Ord. 11, r. 1(1)(b). The true question,
according to Lord Mustill, was "whether an extra-territorial jurisdiction
grounded only on the presence of assets within the territory is one which
sub-paragraph (b) and its predecessors were intended to assert."131 He
was confident that the answer was "no": the rule contemplated only
applications for permanent injunctions.132
By contrast, Lord Mustill held that the purpose of the Hong
Kong (and English) service exjuris rules was:
to authorise the service on a person who would not otherwise be compellable to appear
before the English court of a document requiring him to submit to the adjudication by
the court of a claim advanced in an action or matter commenced by that document. Such
a claim will be for relief founded on a right asserted by the plaintiff in the action or
matter, and enforced through the medium of a judgment given by the court in that action
or matter. The document at the same time defines the relief claimed, institutes the
proceedings in which it is claimed, and when properly served compels the defendant to
enter upon the proceedings or suffer judgment and execution in default. Absent a claim
based on a legal right which the defendant can be called upon to answer, of a kind falling
within Ord. 11, r. 1 (1), the court has no right to authorise the service of the document on
the foreigner, or to invest it with any power to compel him to take part in proceedings
against his will.133
On this view, the purpose of the rule is to allow service out so
that substantive claims may be adjudicated. It follows that an
application for a Mareva injunction is simply not the sort of relief
included within Ord. 11. It does not seek the enforcement of rights as
between the plaintiff and the defendant: instead, "it merely ensures that
once the mechanisms of enforcement are set in motion, there is
something physically available upon which they can work."134 Lord
Mustill turned to the very language of Ord. 11 itself for support. The
initial paragraph of r. 1 refers to "the action begun by the writ," which to
130 Mercedes-Benz, supra note 7 at 301.
131 Ibid.
132 See, for example, James North, supra note 43.
133 Mercedes-Benz, supra note 7 at 301.
134 Ibid. at 302.
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Lord Mustill demonstrated that Ord. 11 was confined to claims for
substantive relief, and an application for a Mareva injunction in aid of
foreign proceedings did not qualify. Thus, he held that there was no
jurisdiction to allow service out on the basis of an application for a
Mareva injunction not based in a substantive cause of action in the
forum.
Lord Mustill repudiated several other arguments which
supported a broad interpretation of the scope of Ord. 11, r. 1(1)(b).
Mercedes-Benz had contended that an anidogy could be drawn with quia
timet injunctions. He held that a quia timet injunction, unlike a Mareva
injunction, presupposes the violation or threatened violation of a
substantive right. The act which a quia timet injunction seeks to prevent
(a violation of rights) is an unlawful one. By contrast, the right to a
Mareva injunction is unconnected to the substantive right underlying the
cause of action, and the act which it seeks to prevent (the dispersal of
assets) is not inherently unlawful. These distinctions were sufficient, in
Lord Mustill's opinion, to render Mareva injunctions outside the scope
of Ord. 11, r. 1(1)(b).
Lord Mustill also rejected the contention that Siskina had, in
effect, been overruled by the enactment of section 25 of the CJJA 1982.135
While he accepted that, for the purposes of the Brussels Convention, a
new set of rules relating to jurisdiction and judgments in general, and
preliminary and protective measures in particular, applied amongst
Convention States, there was no indication at all that The Siskina's
common law rule had been overruled outside the Brussels Convention
context. This conclusion was reinforced by the observation that, in the
present case, the forum was Hong Kong, which (like Canada) has no
statutory equivalent to section 25 of the cJJ, 1982, ancLno relationship to
the Brussels Convention.
Although his views on the issue of personal jurisdiction were
sufficient to dispose of the appeal, Lord Mustill conceded that the
substantive jurisdictional question was a live one:
It may well be that in some future case where there is undoubted personal jurisdiction
over the defendant but no substantive proceedings are brought against him in the court,
be it in Hong Kong or in England, possessing such jurisdiction, an attempt will be made
to obtain Mareva relief in support of a claim pursued in a foreign court. If the
considerations fully explored in the dissenting judgment of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead
were then to prevail a situation would exist in which the availability of relief otherwise
considered permissible and expedient would depend upon the susceptibility of the
defendant to personal service. Their Lordships believe that it would merit the close
attention of the rule-making body to consider whether, by an enlargement of Ord 11, r
135 Discussed supra at text accompanying notes 91-94.
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1(1), a result could be achieved which for the reasons already stated is not open on the
present form of the rule.
13 6
This passage suggests that he was inviting the legislature to
overturn the decision. It highlights the regret which many must feel that
such an evolution was not thought to be possible by way of the processes
of the common law itself.137 It seems clear that the majority was
reluctant to decide as it did, but it is equally clear that Lord Mustill felt
compelled by the language and the history of the statutory provision to
reach his conclusion.
C. Lord Nicholls' Dissenting Speech
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead began his dissent with the following
words:
The first defendant's argument comes to this: his assets are in Hong Kong, so the
Monaco court cannot reach them; he is in Monaco, so the Hong Kong court cannot reach
him. That cannot be right. That is not acceptable today. A person operating
internationally cannot so easily defeat the judicial process. There is not a black hole into
which a defendant can escape out of sight and become unreachable.
138
Like the majority, Lord Nicholls agreed that the substantive
authority of the courts to order a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign
legal proceedings should be distinguished, and addressed separately,
from the issue of personal jurisdiction over an absent defendant by
service out. But unlike the majority, Lord Nicholls suggested that the
personal jurisdiction issue could not properly be addressed until the
substantive issue had been settled.
Lord Nicholls held that, where a plaintiff had begun litigation
abroad and the defendant was physically present in the forum, the
domestic courts would unquestionably possess the authority to order a
Mareva injunction to enjoin the defendant from disposing of assets in
order to render herself judgment-proof. Indeed, the need for such an
authority would be "particularly compelling when the foreign court has
136 Mercedes-Benz, supra note 7 at 304-05.
137 Especially given the House of Lords' view, reiterated in several recent cases, that it can
continue to develop the common law: see, for example, White v. Jones, [1995] 2 A.C. 207; Woolwich
Equitable Building Soc'y v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1993] A.C. 70; and Lipkin Gorman (a
firm) v. Karpnale Ltd., [1991] 2 A.C. 548. Although the composition of the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council and the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords is not identical, it is for
practical purposes very similar.
13 8 Mercedes-Benz, supra note 7 at 305.
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no power to grant interim relief in respect of assets outside its territorial
jurisdiction." 139 Like the majority, he held that the scope of the Mareva
injunction could only be properly defined by reference to the remedy's
underlying rationale. He agreed that a Mareva injunction "is not
connected with the subject matter of the cause of action in issue in the
proceedings,"U40 and that the cause of action is "essentially irrelevant"
when considering the jurisdiction of the court to order Mareva relief.141
To the contrary, Mareva relief is not so much granted in aid of a
cause of action as it is to protect the process of the court. Given the
essentially protective function of the Mareva injunction in safeguarding a
prospective enforcement process, Lord Nicholls held that the reasons
underlying the application of the Mareva injunction in aid of domestic
litigation applied equally to foreign litigation. The reasons that domestic
courts recognize and enforce foreign judgments and arbitral awards
could be extended to enable domestic courts to order provisional and
protective relief in aid of those (prospective) foreign judgments and
awards.
Lord Nicholls then grappled directly with Siskina. In his view,
Siskina's authority was attenuated by the fact that the Law Lords had not
addressed the jurisdictional and substantive elements of the case
separately. Moreover, Siskina had been decided only three years after
the substantive jurisdiction to award Mareva relief had first been claimed
by the Court of Appeal. Consequently, the Law Lords did not then have
the benefit of the subsequent consolidation and development of the
substantive Mareva injunction jurisdiction. Accordingly, Siskina's
pronouncements as to the personal jurisdictional limits upon the court's
ability to award Mareva injunctions had been made at a time when the
Mareva injunction itself was in its infancy, and the contours of the
substantive jurisdiction to award it were in flux. In such circumstances, it
was not surprising that the Law Lords had tended to caution in outlining
the limits of the personal jurisdictional requirements to award Mareva
relief.
In addition, the development subsequent to Siskina of an
undoubted jurisdiction to award anti-suit injunctions indicated that a
rigid approach to the categorization of the court's ability to award
injunctive relief was inappropriate. As conditions changed, so too would
1 3 9 Ibid
140 Ibid. at 306.
141 Ibid. at 307 (although the plaintiff's chances of success in an underlying cause of action
might well prove to be an important element in deciding whether to exercise the court's jurisdiction
to award relief, it will not determine the existence or scope of the jurisdiction itself).
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the court's ability to award injunctive relief to keep pace with
developments. The award of Mareva injunctions in aid of foreign
proceedings was indicative of this. Moreover, the enactment of section
37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981142 had resolved any doubts as to the
juridical soundness of the Mareva injunction.
Lord Nicholls considered that Channel Tunnel had placed an
important qualification upon Siskina. The Law Lords in Channel Tunnel
had determined that Siskina's requirement that, as a precondition to the
awarding of Mareva relief, there must be "a cause of action recognised
by English law," or a substantive right "subject to the jurisdiction of the
English court" would be satisfied where the cause of action was itself
justiciable by the English court.143 However, due to a contractual choice
of court clause, the litigation (or, as was the case in Channel Tunnel, the
arbitration) was to take place abroad. Given this, the answer to the
substantive question posed in Mercedes-Benz was that the court
possessed the jurisdiction to order a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign
proceedings, at least where the litigation or arbitration was potentially
justiciable by the forum court and where the defendant was subject to
the service of process.1 44
Of course, the Mareva injunction's status as interim and
protective relief meant that, until the applicant secured a foreign
judgment or award and sought to enforce it in the forum, no substantive
relief could be claimed. The question was whether a Mareva injunction
sought in anticipation of a foreign judgment or award could be said to be
founded upon a cause of action. The question was not easily answered,
mostly because discussion of the point was "doomed to be circular."14S
To say that a "cause of action" was required was simply to beg the
question: a "cause of action" is no more than a lawyer's category for a
set of facts to which a remedy will attach. Lord Nicholls' view was that
lawyers tend to think of causes of action in terms of traditional
categories. Once outside those categories, the term "cause of action"
carried very little explanatory power. Again, the anti-suit injunction
served as a prime example. What right does an anti-suit injunction
protect, other than a right not to be sued in a foreign court where it
would be unconscionable so to do? To attempt to locate a cause of
142 Supra note 12.
143 Supra note 45 at 360-61.
144 Ibid. at 310 ("The boundary line of the Mareva jurisdiction is to be drawn so as to include
prospective foreign judgments which will be recognised and enforceable in the Hong Kong courts.")
145 Ibid.
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action underlying the award of an anti-suit injunction was to engage in a
tautological inquiry. Lord Nicholls pointed to a Norwich Pharmacal
order 146 as another example of provisional relief which was not
concerned with resolution of the underlying dispute between the parties.
So, although Lord Nicholls did not dispute Siskina's requirement
that there be an underlying cause of action in order to ground Mareva
relief, he indicated that there was no valid reason why the cause of
action in question had to be one under adjudication in the court from
which Mareva relief was being sought. To the contrary, the House of
Lords' decision in Channel Tunnel showed that a cause of action being
litigated or arbitrated in aforeign forum would suffice. Insofar as Siskina
required a pre-existing cause of action to ground the award of Mareva
relief, Lord Nicholls would have overruled that decision.
Having answered the substantive question in the affirmative,
Lord Nicholls then turned to the issue of personal jurisdiction. Given
that the defendant was not present in the jurisdiction, could he be served
with the writ? The analysis centred upon the proper interpretation of
Ord. 11, r. 1(1)(b). Given Lord Nicholls' conclusion on the substantive
question that "[a] claim for a Mareva injunction may stand alone in an
action, on its own feet, as a form of relief granted in anticipation of and
to protect enforcement of a judgment as yet to be obtained in other
proceedings,"1 47 he did not doubt that such relief fell squarely into the
category established by Ord. 11, r. 1(1)(b). Simply put, that rule applies
to all types of injunctions, and the Mareva injunction, though admittedly
unusual, is nonetheless an injunction for the purpose of the rule.
Underlying Lord Nicholls' dissent was a concern that the
processes of justice should not be undermined by sophisticated litigants.
Otherwise, it would be simple for the legal process to be defeated, a
consideration underlined by the speed and ease with which assets may be
transferred over jurisdictional boundaries.
146 See Nonvich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners, [1974] A.C. 133 (H.L.)
(an order requiring the disclosure of the name of the proper defendant to an action).
14 7 Mercedes-Benz, supra note 7 at 313 [emphasis in original].
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D. Aftermath
Academic reaction to the Privy Council's decision in
Mercedes-Benz has been generally hostile.148 For the most part,
commentators regret that the Board did not adopt a more ambitious
approach to the award of provisional relief in aid of foreign proceedings.
But at the same time, commentators also indicate that the composition
of the majority--consisting of some of the leading Law Lords-means
that Mercedes-Benz is unlikely to be revisited in the near future, and that
it will be adopted in England as well as in Hong Kong. They have
consequently concentrated their efforts at securing legislative reversal of
the decision, although some hold out the hope that were the question to
be addressed by the House of Lords it might be answered differently) 49
Indeed, the existence of section 25(3) of the CJJA 1982, which allows the
extension of the Brussels Convention's framework for interim remedies
to other states by Order in Council, is pointed to as evidence that
legislative intent would be honoured by adopting a narrow reading of the
courts' power to award Mareva relief.
Canadian courts and commentators should question whether the
logic of Mercedes-Benz is written in stone for them. It is a central
argument of this article that Mercedes-Benz does not control Canadian
courts, and that it is both open to Canadian courts, as well as desirable,
for them to follow the compelling dissent of Lord Nicholls in
Mercedes-Benz and to adopt a more coherent approach to the award of
provisional and protective relief in aid of foreign proceedings. In the
following parts, I argue that the Canadian context is different in
significant ways from its English and Hong Kong counterparts, and that
there are convincing reasons which justify a distinct approach to Mareva
relief in aid of foreign proceedings. Moreover, recent developments
indicate that Canadian courts are striking out on their own path, and
that there are no obstacles left to the development of a Canadian
jurisdiction to awardMareva relief in aid of foreign proceedings.
148 See D. Capper, "The Trans-Jurisdictional Effects of Mareva Injunctions" (1996) 15 Civ.
Just. Q. 211 at 230 [hereinafter "Trans-Jurisdictional Effects"]; L. Collins, "The Siskina Again: An
Opportunity Missed" (1996) 112 L.Q. Rev. 8; N.H. Andrews, "Mareva Relief Cannot Stand Alone:
Further Judicial Reflections Upon the Siskina Doctrine" [1996] Camb. L.J. 12; L. Aitken, "The
Juridical Basis of the Mareva Injunction" (1996) 70 Aust. L.J. 109; and S. Gee, "Mercedes and
Mareva" (1995) 139 Solic. J. 1076.
149 See "Trans-Jurisdictional Effects" supra note 148 at 231.
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IV. A CANADIAN APPROACH TO THE AWARD OFMAREVA
INJUNCTIONS IN AID OF FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS
A. Introduction
For several years, Canadian courts adopted Siskina
wholeheartedly,l5O and even recently, courts which stray from Siskina
have been reversed on appeal.lSi Ontario authority has reiterated and
supported Siskina's requirement that there must be a cause of action in
the jurisdiction to ground injunctive relief.152 Yet some courts have
expressed sentiments which draw into question the continuing
dominance of Siskina. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal recently relied
upon Channel Tunnel to support the following propositions:
There are only two limitations on a superior court's jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief,
whether interlocutory or final:
i) The court must have personal jurisdiction in that the defendant is amenable to the
jurisdiction of the court, and
150 Litz v. Litz (1995), 101 Man. R. (2d) 40 at 45 (Q.B.) (injunction must be granted in
conjunction with an action known to law); Kaiser Resources Ltd. v. Western Canada Beverage Corp.
(1992), 71 B.C.L.R. (2d) 236 at 244-45 (S.C.) [hereinafter Kaiser Resources] (injunctive relief
ancillary to substantive cause of action refused); Burkart v. Dairy Producers Co-Op. Ltd. (1990), 87
Sask. R. 241 at 247-48 (C.A.) (court may not order an injunction in the absence of a substantive
cause of action within its jurisdiction); Suncorp Realty, supra note 104 at 95-97 (same); C.D.N.
Research and Development Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981), 32 O.R. (2d) 578 (H.C.J.) (Mareva
injunction unavailable where no claim made against defendant); and Standal Estate, supra note 83 at
135.
151 See Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net, [1996] 1 F.C. 787 (C.A.),
rev'g [1992] 3 F.C. 155 (T.D.), leave to appeal granted, [1996] 3 S.C.R. vi (Federal Court has no
authority to enforc6 statutory prohibitions by means of interlocutory injunction where Parliament
has specifically provided a scheme of administrative enforcement which does not include interim
remedies).
1 5 2 Ash v. Lloyd's Corp. (1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 755 at 760 (C.A.), Carthy J.A., leave to appeal
refused, [1992] 3 S.C.R. v ("There must be a lis between the parties which is deserving of a trial
before there can be anything that is interlocutory in the proceedings leading to trial."); F&C
International Inc. v. 176836 Canada Ltd., [1993] O.J. No. 8 (Gen. Div.) (QL) (interlocutory
injunction unavailable where plaintiffs do not seek permanent injunction as part of their claim);
ATL Industries Inc. v. Han Eol Ind. Co. (1995), 36 C.P.C. (3d) 288 at 317-18 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)
(Comm. List)); and CellularRental Systems Inc. v. Bell Mobility Cellularlna (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 766
at 778-80 (Ont. Div. Ct.), revg (1994), 116 D.L.R. (4th) 514 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) (there must be a
his between the parties to ground a motion for an interlocutory injunction).
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ii) The plaintiff must have a cause of action.
1 5 3
The Ontario Court of Appeal continued this revisionist trend in
Fastfrate,154 where the Crown sought an injunction against a company
charged with participation in a price-fixing conspiracy under section
45(1)(c) of the Competition Act.1S5 The company sold its assets before
trial, and was in the process of transferring the proceeds of sale to its
American parent. The majority held that the courts possess the
jurisdiction to grant a "Mareva type of injunction" to preserve assets in
the jurisdiction so that the defendant in a criminal prosecution cannot
render itself judgment-proof should a fine be ordered against it. The
Court declined to make such an order on the facts "of the case, however.
Weiler J.A., concurring, held that Ontario courts possess
jurisdiction to grant an injunction "as long as there is an issue which
would be justiciable."1s6 This suggests that the normal requirement for
the granting of an injunction is a cause of action before the court. But,
as in England, Ontario courts may also grant an injunction where an
issue is "justiciable," meaning that an injunction may be awarded where
the issue would have grounded a cause of action in Ontario but for a stay
of proceedings there.157
B. BMWE v. Canadian Pacific Ltd.
Canadian questioning of Siskina recently culminated in a
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, which has apparently now
swept Siskina aside. In BMWE v. Canadian Pacific Ltd.,15s8 a railway
company altered the work schedule for its employees. The union
representing the employees objected to the change and filed a grievance
under its collective agreement with the railway. The union also obtained
an interlocutory injunction from the British Columbia Supreme Court
restraining the railway from changing the existing work schedule. The
153 Amherst (Town) v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. (1994), 133 N.S.R. (2d) 277 at 279
[hereinafter Amherst]. Note that no indication was given that the cause of action must be in the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.
154 Supra note 20.
155 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34.
156 Supra note 20 at 590ff, under the Ontario Courts of Justice Act, supra note 13, s. 101(1).
15 7 Weiler J.A. thus approved of the approach taken by the House of Lords in Channel
Tunnel, supra note 45.
158 [1996] 2 S.C.R. 495 [hereinafter BMwE].
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company unsuccessfully appealed the injunction order to the British
Columbia Court of Appeal,159 arguing that the Canada Labour Code160
provided no forum for interlocutory injunctions.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the issues were
whether the superior courts of British Columbia possessed the
substantive jurisdiction to issue injunctions in connection with disputes
arising out of collective agreements; and, importantly for our purposes,
whether those same courts could issue interlocutory injunctions in the
absence of an underlying cause of action. The Court answered both
questions in the affirmative.
McLachlin J., for the Court, addressed squarely the railway's
argument that an interlocutory injunction must be ancillary to a
substantive cause of action. In her view, any restrictions stemming from
Siskina as to the courts' power to make such orders had been removed
by the Law Lords in Channel Tunnel.161 She observed that, in Channel
Tunnel, the Law Lords had "categorically reject[ed] the submission that
to grant interim relief, the courts must have jurisdiction over the cause
of action." 162 Indeed, Channel Tunnel had been received into Canadian
law on this point, to the effect that "the courts have jurisdiction to grant
an injunction where there is a justiciable right, wherever that right may
fall to be determined." 163 Accordingly, McLachlin J. held that the
British Columbia Supreme Court had jurisdiction to order an interim
injunction even in the absence of a cause of action seeking final relief.
The Court in BMWE addressed neither Mareva injunctions nor the
transnational context, and the decision did not advert to the Privy
Council's decision in Mercedes-Benz, perhaps because the issue of
personal jurisdiction simply did not arise on the facts. Yet there can be
little doubt, given the breadth of the language used by McLachlin J., that
both Siskina and Mercedes-Benz have been decisively rejected in Canada,
insofar as they purport to make an accrued cause of action a necessary
precursor to the award of a Mareva injunction. This is a welcome
development, though regrettably, the Court's reasoning in BMWE was
rather brisk on this point. The underlying rationale of the Siskina
doctrine was neither identified nor addressed: it was simply dismissed as
159 (1994), 93 B.C.L.R. (2d) 176.
160 R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2.
161 Supra note 45.
162 BMWE, supra note 158 at 504.
1631bkd at 505, citing Amherst, supra note 153; Fastfrate, supra note 20; and Kaiser Resources,
supra note 150.
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having been rejected by the Law Lords themselves, an account which is
accurate only in part, as I have suggested in Part II(B)(2), above.
Although the Supreme Court in BMWE said nothing directly
about the personal jurisdiction issue addressed in Siskina and
Mercedes-Benz, the Court's definitive language as to the substantive
jurisdiction to order Mareva relief necessarily implies a similarly relaxed
approach to the taking of personal jurisdiction for the purpose of
ordering Mareva injunctions. Consequently, the scene is ripe for
consideration of a greater willingness to award interim relief in aid of
foreign proceedings, even where the defendant is outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the domestic court.
C. The Constitutional Context
Even before Siskina was overruled by the Supreme Court in
BMWE, there were inklings in a number of Canadian decisions that an
alternative approach was evolving. As BMWE was concerned with a
context other than Mareva injunctions, it is useful to examine this line of
authority so as to determine where BMWE'S overruling of Siskina leaves
the ability of Canadian courts to order Mareva injunctions in aid of
foreign proceedings.
In the pre-Morguard64 world, in which sister provinces were
treated as foreign jurisdictions for the purpose of the recognition and
enforcement of judgments, a case very similar to the facts of
Mercedes-Benz arose. In NEC Corp. v. Steintron International Electronics
Ltd.,165 an Ontario court ordered a Mareva-type injunction to prevent
the disposition of assets from Ontario where the plaintiff had succeeded
at trial in British Columbia and there was evidence indicating that the
defendant would attempt to dissipate its assets while the British
Columbia judgment was under appeal. The plaintiff had obtained an ex
parte order registering the British Columbia judgment in Ontario under
the latter province's reciprocal enforcement legislation.16 6 The court
was convinced that the defendant was attempting to dispose of its
Ontario assets to frustrate the plaintiffs efforts to enforce its British
Columbia judgment there.
16 4 Morguard, supra note 105.
165 (1985), 52 O.R. (2d) 201 (H.C.J.) [hereinafter NEC].
1 6 6 ReciprocalEnforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 432, s. 2 (now R.S.O. 1990, c. R.5,
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NEC was decided before Aetna,167 the leading Canadian decision
on the impact of the federal context upon Mareva injunctions. Although
the Supreme Court of Canada in Aetna did not go so far as to prohibit
intra-Canadian Mareva injunctions, the Court did indicate that the
federal nature of Canada must be taken into account. In consequence,
the Court narrowed the scope of the availability of an interprovincial
Mareva injunction such as that made in NEc.168 Although Aetna would
have had no impact upon the application of NEC's logic to Mareva
injunctions in aid of truly foreign proceedings, the Supreme Court's
celebrated decision in Morguard,169 and the subsequent debate as to
whether the Morguard principles apply not only to the judgments of
other Canadian provinces, but to truly foreign judgments as well, leave
NEC's continuing vitality open to some doubt. It is perhaps ironic that
Aetna came before Morguard, although it probably made the latter
decision inevitable.1 70
In Morguard, the Supreme Court of Canada mandated the
recognition and enforcement of judgments issued by sister provinces
where there is a real and substantial connection between the defendant
and the court rendering judgment. This rule has subsequently been
extended by a number of lower courts to judgments rendered by
American states.171 Morguard and its eventual application to truly
foreign judgments was presaged in some ways by DiMenza v. Richardson
Greenshields of Canada Ltd.,172 where the court refused to order a
Mareva injunction enjoining the removal of assets from Ontario where
the defendant was moving to Maryland and the defendant advanced
evidence that an Ontario judgment could be enforced against him there.
1 6 7 Aetna, supra note 11.
168 Ibid. at 36-38. The decision in Aetna was influenced by the fact that the defendant had
submitted to the jurisdiction of the Manitoba courts, so that any eventual Manitoba judgment would
be enforceable in Ontario or Quebec: seeAetna, supra note 11 at 27-29.
169 Supra note 105.
170 See E. Gertner, "Prejudgment Remedies and the New Constitutional Order" in Special
Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada 1988: Rights and Remedies in the Law of Debtor and
Creditor (Don Mills, Ont.: De Boo, 1988) 37. Zellers, supra note 24, was a post-Aetna, pre-Morguard
decision which declined to award a worldwide Mareva injunction dealing with assets in Ontario,
although it did not cite Aetna.
171 See, for example, United States v. Ivey (1995), 26 O.R. (3d) 533 (Gen. Div.), aff'd (1996) 30
O.R. (3d) 370 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1996] S.C.C.A. No. 582 (QL), 29 May 1997
[hereinafter Ivey] (applying Morguard test to a Michigan judgment); and Moses v. Shore Boat
Builders Ltd. (1993), 83 B.C.L.R. (2d) 177 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1994] 1 S.C.R. xi
(applying Morguard test to an Alaska judgment).
172 (1989), 74 O.R. (2d) 172 (Div. Ct.).
[VOL 34 No. 4
1996] The Mareva Injunction in Aid of Foreign Proceedings 785
At the very least, the case law indicates the close relationship between
the award of Mareva injunctions and the rules concerning the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
It seems likely, then, that the logic of Morguard would only
reinforce Aetna's reluctance to allow interprovincial Mareva
injunctions.173 However, one should not be so quick to assume that
Morguard's more liberal approach to the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments has obviated entirely the need for Mareva injunctions
within Canada, let alone with regard to truly foreign judgments.1 74
There may be some cases in which a plaintiff should be entitled to a
Mareva injunction from a court in one province in aid of proceedings in
another province175
173 Fastfrate, supra note 20 at 605-06, Weiler J.A. ("Clearly, a threatened removal of assets
outside of Canada is more likely to lead to the granting of aMareva injunction because, generally, it
is more difficult to enforce a judgment outside the jurisdiction.") This suggests that the availability
of Mareva relief is inversely related to the perceived ease of enforcing the judgment abroad. Weiler
J.A. seems to forget, however, that it is unlikely that a judgment emanating from the Competition
Act would be enforceable abroad, as it would likely be considered an attempt to enforce a penal or
revenue law by a foreign court.
174 In Fastfrate, supra note 20, Weiler J.A. gave Aetna a relatively narrow interpretation, as did
Southin J. in Gateway Village Investments Ltd. v. Sybra Food Services Ltd. (1987), 12 B.C.L.R. (2d)
234 (S.C.). See also Candour Group Enterprises Inc. v. Argon Financial Consultants Inc. (1989), 25
C.P.R. (3d) 555 at 564 (B.C.S.C.) (Mareva injunction granted restraining defendants from removing
assets from British Columbia); and Bradley Resources Corp. v. Kelvin Energy Ltd. (1985), 61 A.R. 169
(C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1985] 1 S.C.R. ix (upholding Mareva-type injunction restraining
disposition of assets from Alberta to British Columbia in support of statutory appraisal remedy).
175 See Imperial Oil v. Gibson (1993), 72 B.C.L.R. 195 at 199 (C.A.) which interprets Aetna,
supra note 11, to say that in some cases, a Mareva injunction will be appropriate even within the
federal system. See also Stinchcombe v. Schwartz, [1991] B.C.J. No. 413 (S.C.) (QL), (McColl J.)
(court declined to award injunction freezing absentee defendant's B.C. assets pending resolution of
Alberta action, on the basis that there was no justiciable action in B.C. which would endow the court
with jurisdiction). But see McLellan v. Parent, [1992] N.W.T.R. 226 (S.C.); and McLellan v. Parent,
[1995] N.W.T.J. No. 66 (S.C.) (QL) (denying applications for interlocutory injunctions concerning
rental income in the Northwest Territories held by a Quebec resident, in part on the basis that
Morguard's liberalization of interprovincial recognition and enforcement of judgment rules meant
that the plaintiff would not suffer irreparable harm if the rental income was not attached pending
trial. The plaintiff would not suffer undue hardship by being forced to enforce the resulting
Northwest Territories judgment in Quebec against the defendant there. Note that the court
assumed-perhaps incorrectly-thatMoguard applies to Quebec. But the court's point is probably
applicable to the common law provinces).
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D. The International Context: Mareva Injunctions in Aid of
"Truly Foreign" Legal Proceedings
Rapid developments in Canadian conflict of laws rules suggest
that Canadian courts may now be more willing to award interim relief in
aid of foreign proceedings. As lower courts have extended Morguard's
more liberal rules for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments to truly foreign judgments, 176 it is strange that an Ontario
court would consider whether (or indeed, be required, depending upon
one's interpretation of Morguard) to recognize and enforce a civil
judgment issued by a court in another province, or an American state or
federal court, yet be unable to afford a plaintiff in the foreign forum
interim measures of relief in order to ensure that the plaintiffs
subsequent attempts (if successful on the merits) to recognize and
enforce that judgment in Ontario would be thwarted by the defendant's
efforts at judgment proofing.
Many American courts, for example, possess the power to order
interim measures in aid of foreign proceedings.177 Similarly, the new
Civil Code of Quebec contains provisions concerning the award of
provisional measures in aid of foreign proceedings.178 Article 3138
provides that
[a] Quebec authority may order provisional or conservatory measures even if it has no
jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute.1 79
176 See cases cited supra note 171.
177 See Barclay's Bank Ltd. v. Tsakos, 543 A.2d 802 (D.C. App. 1988) [hereinafter Tsakos],
(allowing attachment of local assets pending the outcome of foreign proceedings). On remand, the
trial court stayed the action pending the outcome of the foreign proceedings: 618 A.2d 134 (D.C.
App. 1992). Tsakos was followed in Mendes v. Dowelanco Indus. Ltda., 651 So.2d 776 (Fla.App. 3
Dist. 1995) (court may stay substantive action on a forum non conveniens basis in favour of foreign
proceedings, but maintain jurisdiction over defendants' assets in the forum in order to satisfy any
judgment the plaintiff might secure; the question of whether the defendants' assets were properly
the subject of orders of the Florida court had not yet been determined). See also Cameco Industries,
supra note 120 (attachment of Maryland assets of non-resident Guatemalan corporation as security
for pending judgment in Louisiana). In some states, the power to attach local assets in aid of
foreign proceedings is specifically provided for by statute. See, for example, New York Civil Practice
Law & Rules § 6201 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
178 See H.P. Glenn, "Droit international priv" in Barreau du Qugbec et la Chiambre des
notaires du Quibec, La R6forme du Code Civil, t. 3 (Ste. Foy, Que.: Les Presses de l'Universit6 Laval,
1993) 671 at 747; Commentaires du ministre de la Justice, t. 2 (Quebec: Minist~re de ]a Justice, 1993)
at 2001-2002 [Loi fidirale sur le droit international priv6 suisse de 1987, art. 10; Convention du 5
octobre 1961 concernant la compitence des autorits et la loi applicable en mati~re de protection des
mineurs de La Haye, arts. 1, 9].
1 79 cCQ, supra note 4.
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The interpretation of the provision arose recently in
Lamborghini (Canada) Inc. c. Automobili Lamborghini S.P.A.,180 where
the Quebec Superior Court addressed an action for damages arising out
of an exclusive distribution agreement between a Canadian dealer and
an Italian manufacturer of luxury sportscars. The agreement contained
an exclusive choice of bourt clause in favour of the courts of Bologna,
Italy. The court dismissed the action on the basis that the defendant had
no place of business in Quebec and the agreement had been concluded
in Italy, so that the Quebec courts had no jurisdiction to entertain the
action.
However, the plaintiff had also sought an injunction even though
the court did not have jurisdiction over the merits of the action. On the
facts, the court declined to order such relief, but it did outline the
circumstances in which it would exercise its discretion to order
provisional or conservatory measures. Following well-established
Quebec case law on the award of interlocutory injunctions,18 1 the court
held that: where the plaintiff's rights were clear, an injunction should be
granted; where doubtful, an injunction should be granted only upon
consideration of the balance of convenience; and where non-existent, an
injunction should be refused.
Could not a system of interim relief in aid of foreign proceedings
be constructed on common law principles alone? Within Canada there
is a unitary court structure, with the Supreme Court of Canada at the
apex. Accordingly, that Court can ensure a degree of control over
jurisdiction and judgments. From this foundation, there would appear
to be no impediments to a Mareva power in aid of foreign proceedings,
given the broad wording of provincial legislation. Although, as discussed
above, it is only in exceptional circumstances that the power would ever
need to be invoked within Canada in relation to the proceedings of
courts in other provinces, where a Mareva injunction is sought from a
Canadian court in aid of truly foreign proceedings, the need for
provisional relief is much clearer.
180 C.S.M. 500-05-013605-942, (2 February 1995), Tremblay J. [unreported]. Related issues in
the case were addressed in the case on appeal: [1996] A.Q. no. 4175 (C.A.) (QL).
181 Sociitf de diveloppement de la Baie James v. Kanatewat, [1975] C.A. 166.
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V. UNITED STATES V. FRIEDLAND
A. Facts
In Friedland, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and the state of Colorado had sued a well-known stock
promoter in a federal district court in Colorado to recover the costs of
cleaning up a polluted mine site in that state. It was alleged that, at the
time that the site had been polluted, it had been owned or operated by a
company controlled by the defendant.
Concerned that the defendant did not have sufficient assets in
the United States to satisfy the anticipated American judgment against
him, the EPA sought a Mareva injunction in British Columbia to prevent
the defendant from removing the assets from Canada. The defendant,
who was overseas, had recently been involved in a transaction in which
he was to receive shares worth some (us) $152 million in a Canadian
mining company. The order restrained the defendant from disposing of
assets, or assets which were about to come into his hands in British
Columbia, pending the disposition of the Colorado suit.
B. Judgment
Injunctions were initially granted in both British Columbia182
and Ontario.1 83 Spencer J., of the British Columbia Supreme Court,
held that the traditional prerequisites for a Mareva injunction had been
met. He also observed, without deciding, that as the defendant was not
a resident of British Columbia, and the Colorado incident had no
-connection with British Columbia, it was unlikely that a substantive
cause of action could be advanced against him in the province.
Nonetheless, Spencer J. held that there was "strong authority" in BMWEr
to support the proposition that the court possessed jurisdiction to award
a Mareva injunction to enjoin the defendant from removing assets from
the province pending disposition of the case in Colorado. Since BMWE,
182 Friedland No. 1, supra note 5. Additional litigation in British Columbia concerned the
ability of the United States government to compel production of privileged communications
between the bankrupt British Columbia Company which allegedly controlled the Colorado
subsidiary, and its Colorado law firm. See Cook v. Parcel, Mauro, Hultin & Spaanstra, P.C. (1997),
143 D.LR. (4th) 213 (B.C.C.A.), aff'g (1996), 136 D.L.R. (4th) 414 (B.C.S.C.). Leave to appeal
refused 10 July 1997: [1997] S.C.C.A. No., 218 (QL).
183 Friedland No. 2, supra note 5
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Spencer J. held, "it is now clear that interlocutory assistance can be
granted to proceedings in a foreign court without an underlying cause of
action."184 Spencer J. also granted leave to serve the defendant exjuris.
The defendant sought a review of the injunctions in both
provinces.18 5 Sharpe J. lifted the Ontario order, but not on the basis of
jurisdictional objections.18 6 Rather, he lifted the orders on the ground
that the EPA representatives had failed to disclose material facts and had
made numerous misleading statements and representations to the court
in the initial injunction applications. Accordingly, the decision
concerned irregularities in the plaintiff's case rather than the
jurisdictional basis for awarding Mareva injunctions in aid of foreign
legal proceedings.
Nonetheless, the Friedland litigation is the first Canadian case to
address such Mareva injunctions, and, in the light of the controversy over
the availability of Mareva relief in aid of foreign legal proceedings,
Canadian courts may be glad of guidance on the issue. At the very least,
Friedland demonstrates that the circumstances under which Mareva
relief may be sought in aid of foreign proceedings are not fanciful, but to
the contrary, are increasingly likely to arise. Moreover, the case also
demonstrates that courts will be careful to balance the needs of the
plaintiff with the rights of the defendant, and that the requirements for
the award of a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign proceedings will be as
strict as those governing a more traditional Mareva injunction.
Friedland No. I's lead was soon followed in Adler, Coleman
Clearing Corp. (Trustee of) v. Roddy DiPrima Ltd.,187 in which Harvey J.
ordered a Mareva injunction in aid of American proceedings. The
plaintiff had brought an action against the defendant in New York for
fraud, deception, and various violations of securities law. The plaintiff
obtained judgment in New York, although the final amount of judgment
remained to be determined at the time of hearing in British Columbia.
The plaintiff sought a Mareva injunction in British Columbia enjoining
the defendant from disposing of $750,000 on deposit in a securities
company in Vancouver, in anticipation of bringing an action to enforce
the New York judgment in British Columbia.
Harvey J. rejected the defendant's contention that the plaintiff
could not obtain an injunction without demonstrating the existence of a
184 Friedland No. 1, supra note 5 at 12.
185 Friedland No. 3, supra note 5.
186 Friedland No. 5, supra note 5.
187 (1997), 28 B.C.L.R. (3d) 181 (S.C.) [hereinafterAdler].
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
cause of action justiciable in British Columbia. Reviewing Friedland No.
I and BWME, Harvey J. concluded that, although an injunction is
generally a remedy which is ancillary to a cause of action, those cases
"are clear authority for the proposition that an interim injunction may
be granted to prevent removal of assets so that they are available for
execution in a foreign judgment."188
Friedland No. 1 andAdler make it clear that Canadian courts are
likely to give an expansive interpretation of McLachlin J.'s reasons in
BMWE with regard to the ability of the courts to award Mareva relief in
aid of foreign proceedings. While this is highly desirable, in neither case
did the court set out principles by which the exercise of this new
jurisdiction could be properly measured. In addition, in citing the broad
language of BMWE, neither court turned its attention to the prudential
concerns which had underlain Siskina. Although I argue in this article
that the Supreme Court of Canada was right to inter Siskina in BMWE,
the concerns motivating the doctrine advanced in Siskina are worthy of
concern, and will have to be addressed in a principled fashion in the
award of Mareva relief in aid of foreign proceedings. In the following
part, I outline principles which attempt to address those concerns.
VI. A PROPOSED APPROACH TO MAREVA INJUNCTIONS
IN AID OF FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS
A. Introduction
In order to set out some principles to guide the courts in
awarding interim measures on the strength of pending or continuing
foreign proceedings, it will be helpful to look to the cases defining the
scope of Mareva injunctions themselves. The central goal of the Mareva
injunction is to prevent the process of the court from being abused by a
defendant who disperses her assets out of the jurisdiction in order to
avoid execution should a judgment be rendered against her.i89 As a
result, it must be emphasized that Mareva injunctions are only to be
awarded where the plaintiff demonstrates that there is a real risk that,
188 Ibid. at 184.
189 Derby Nos. 3 & 4, supra note 3 at 76, Lord Donaldson of Lymington M.R. ("The
fundamental principle underlying this jurisdiction is that, within the limits of its powers, no court
should permit a defendant to take action designed to ensure that subsequent orders of the court are
rendered less effective than would otherwise be the case.") But see Dunlop, supra note 9 at 139
(citing authority critical of the abuse of process theory).
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unless an injunction is ordered, the defendant will remove her assets
from the jurisdiction in order to evade judgments against her.190 Mere
suspicion or a grab for a tactical advantage over an opponent in
litigation are insufficient to ground an injunction, as Friedland
demonstrates. The following parts outline the circumstances under
which a Canadian court may determine whether to order a Mareva
injunction in aid of foreign proceedings. A number of related issues are
also addressed.
B. In What Circumstances Should a Canadian Court
Aid Foreign Proceedings?
Domestic courts should order Mareva relief in aid of foreign
proceedings only where a judgment or award emanating from those
foreign proceedings would likely be recognized in the domestic court.
To a great degree, a prospective decision as to whether a foreign
judgment or award would be recognized or enforced in the domestic
jurisdiction can be made by the domestic court, although there are
admittedly some difficulties.19 1 In order to determine prospectively
whether a foreign judgment or award would be recognised in Canada, a
domestic court most consider whether, according to Canadian law, the
foreign court or tribunal properly has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. Traditionally, this meant that the defendant had to be served
with process in the foreign jurisdiction at the time the suit was
commenced,192 or had submitted,193 or agreed to submit, to the
jurisdiction of the foreign court or tribunal.194
More recently, there has been some uncertainty as to whether
the "real and substantial connection" test enunciated in Morguard, with
regard to the recognition and enforcement of judgments in the
190 Derby No. 6, supra note 24 at 1153; Ninemia Maritime Corp. v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft
M.B.H. und Co. K.G. ('The Niedersachsen'), [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1412 at 1422 (C.A.). This satisfies the
requirement that the Mareva injunction in aid of foreign proceedings should be awarded only when
"truly necessary" to protect the jurisdiction and process of the foreign court or tribunal. See Westin
& Chrocziel, supra note 59 at 743.
191 Lord Denning M.R. in the Court of Appeal in Siskina, supra note 38 at 809, expressly
stated that the anticipated foreign judgments in that case would be recognized and enforced in
England.
192 Emanuel v. Symon, [1908] 1 K.B. 302 (C.A.); and Schibsby v. Westenholz (1870), L.R. 6
Q.B. 155.
193 Ibid.
194 Feyerickv. Hubbard (1902), 71 LJ.K.B. 509.
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interprovincial context, also applies to "truly foreign" judgments.l95
That issue need not be resolved here: the point is simply that the
domestic court, in determining whether to order a Mareva injunction in
aid of foreign proceedings, must evaluate-to the extent
possible-whether it would be likely to recognize and enforce the final
outcome of those proceedings. If it would not, then it should refuse to
order a Mareva injunction in aid of them. The plaintiff should bear the
onus of demonstrating-on a balance of probabilities-that any
judgment or award emanating from the foreign proceedings would be
enforceable in the forum.
Once it is determined that the foreign court properly took
jurisdiction over the defendant, a number of other conditions must be
satisfied in order for a foreign judgment or award to be eligible for
recognition and enforcement in Canada. The judgment or award196
must be final and conclusive (i.e., res judicata, and so not open to
re-examination by the court or tribunal which gave it),197 and for a fixed
sum of money.198 As well, the judgment or award must not be
vulnerable to the raising of certain defences against it: it must not have
been procured by fraud,1 99 or rendered in contravention of natural
justice,200 or contrary to the public policy of the Canadian court.2 01
Further, the subject matter of the foreign judgment or award must not
concern foreign revenue, penal, or other public law.202 Finally, the
foreign judgment or award must not be inconsistent with a prior.
Canadian judgment or award. Where it can be shown that the
anticipated foreign judgment or award would not satisfy one or more of
these conditions, no Mareva injunction should be awarded in aid of it.
195 See cases cited supra note 105.
196 Similar conditions apply for recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under
common law: Norske Atlas Insurance Co. Ltd. v. London General Insurance Co. Ltd. (1927), Lloyd's
List L. Rep. 104 (K.B.D.)
19 7 Nouvion v. Freeman (1889), 15 App. Cas. 1 (H.L.). The fact that the judgment may be
subject to appeal in the foreign jurisdiction is irrelevant, although the domestic court may choose to
stay enforcement pending the appeal: Colt Industries v. Sarlie (No. 2), [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1287 (C.A.).
198 Sadler v. Robins (1808), 1 Camp. 253,170 E.R. 948. But see below at Part VI(H).
199 Jacobs v. Beaver (1908), 17 O.L.R. 496 (C.A.); Four Embarcadero Center Venture v. Kalen
(1988), 65 O.R. (2d) 551 (H.C.J.) [hereinafter Four Embarcadero]; and Abouloff v. Oppenheimer &
Co. (1882), 10 Q.B.D. 925 (C.A.).
200 Ivey, supra note 171; Four Embarcadero, supra note 165; Adams v. Cape Industries I'LC,
[1990] Ch. 433 (C.A.); and Pemberton v. Hughes, [1899] 1 Ch. 781 (C.A.).
201 Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Maalouf (1992), 6 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.).
202 Ivey, supra note 171; and Huntington v.Attrill, [1893] A.C. 150 (P.C.).
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Some of these factors, by their very nature, will not be amenable
to determination by a Canadian court until judgment has been rendered
by the foreign court or tribunal. For example, at the time that a Mareva
injunction in aid for foreign proceedings is sought from a Canadian
court, there may be no evidence or indication that the foreign
proceedings have been procured by fraud or in violation of natural
justice. However, once a Mareva injunction is ordered, the defendant in
the foreign proceedings should be able to seek review of the order and
have it dissolved if he or she can demonstrate that the foreign judgment
or award would not be recognized or enforced in Canada due to a
violation of one of the above conditions, even if at that time no such
judgment or award has yet been rendered. Where the defendant can
demonstrate this, any Mareva injunction which has been ordered should
be dissolved.
In addition, as Lord Nicholls suggested in Mercedes-Benz,20 3 in
exercising its discretion to order a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign
proceedings, the court must evaluate the plaintiff's prospects of
obtaining judgment in the foreign forum. This may appear at first to be
a Herculean task, and it is conceded that such a process is
impressionistic at best. But it should also be recalled that the same issue
must be addressed in purely domestic Mareva injunction decisions.
Whenever a court awards a Mareva injunction, it is bound to determine
theprima facie merits of the plaintiff's case. Such a determination need
not necessarily be more difficult where the case is being litigated abroad.
Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate to the court's satisfaction
that, even if he were to be successful in the foreign litigation, the
defendant does not possess sufficient assets in the foreign jurisdiction to
satisfy the judgment. If the defendant possesses sufficient assets in the
foreign jurisdiction to satisfy the anticipated judgment or award then,
absent special circumstances, the assistance of the Canadian courts is not
required.2 04 Indeed, it would amount to an abuse of process to allow the
plaintiff to invoke the processes of the Canadian courts for the purpose
of obtaining a Mareva injunction to freeze assets of the defendant
unnecessarily.
203 Supra note 7 at 307.
204 See Derby & Co. supra note 24, where the English Court of Appeal emphasized, in the
context of worldwide Mareva injunctions, that the plaintiff must show that the defendant's assets
within the forum are insufficient to meet the plaintiffs claim, but that the defendant possesses
sufficient assets abroad for this purpose. In the case of a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign
proceedings, the reverse should be true. The plaintiff should be required to show that the
defendant has insufficient assets in the foreign forum to satisfy the plaintiffs claim, but that the
defendant does possess assets in the territorial jurisdiction of the domestic court.
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Must foreign proceedings already have been commenced before
Mareva relief could be sought from a Canadian common law court? It is
difficult to see a valid reason why such a requirement should be thought
necessary. The element of surprise is often essential to the success of
provisional relief, and it may be that in some cases the defendant's assets
must be frozen even before the foreign proceedings are commenced.
The procedural requirements of foreign law might be cumbersome
enough to justify a Canadian court to order a Mareva injunction in
relation to assets located here in anticipation of the plaintiff
commencing proceedings abroad. The plaintiff would have to provide
an undertaking to commence the foreign proceedings within a specified
period of time, and the defendant would be able to revisit the injunction
if the plaintiff did not comply with the undertaking.2 05 Alternatively, the
injunction itself could be deemed to expire after a specified date.
Finally, the normal requirement that notice be provided by the
plaintiff to the defendant that an injunction has been ordered against
her, and also that notice be provided to relevant third parties
(particularly financial institutions) should also be upheld in the award of
Mareva injunctions in aid of foreign proceedings. The fact that such
injunctions are being awarded in aid of foreign proceedings also suggests
that notice of the award of the injunction be provided to the foreign
court or tribunal in whose aid they are awarded, and that notice of
subsequent revisions or modifications to the injunction also be provided
to the foreign court or tribunal. This may go some distance to ensuring
that the domestic and foreign courts do not issue contradictory orders.
C. Why Not Bring an Action in the Forum?
Given the lingering practical and doctrinal uncertainties
associated with a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign proceedings, one
might well ask why the prudent litigant would not attempt to avoid such
problems simply by bringing an action in the domestic forum in which
relief is sought. If a litigant wants an Ontario court to order a Mareva
injunction, why not bring an action in Ontario for this purpose? In some
cases, it will be both possible and prudent to do so. On the authority of
Fastfrate2O6 an Ontario court could order a Mareva injunction (provided
205 The situation would be very similar to that inA. v. B., supra note 75; and D.C. Taxation,
supra note 84; and other Australian cases cited supra note 86.
2 0 6 Supra note 20. See also Trade Fortune, supra note 69; Channel Tunnel, supra note 45; and
DefAmerican, supra note 67.
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of course that the usual requirements for a Mareva injunction were made
out) even if the action in Ontario were to be stayed in favour of the
foreign action. Consequently, it may be possible to, in effect, bring an
action or seek a declaration in an Ontario court merely for the purpose
of obtaining ancillary (Mareva) relief. 207
When a domestic court stays proceedings on the basis of the
forum non conveniens doctrine, it is not divesting itself of subject-matter
jurisdiction: rather, it is choosing to defer to a foreign court on the
theory that it is more just and appropriate for the matter to be tried
elsewhere 2 08 A court can award a Mareva injunction and then order a
stay of proceedings in favour of a foreign court on the basis of the forum
non conveniens doctrine.2 09 It appears that it can do so even where the
plaintiff brings the action in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction or choice
of court clause 2 10 Thus, a plaintiff might well consent to a stay of its
own action in Ontario in favour of trial abroad (where proceedings
might already have been commenced), so long as the Ontario court
ordered a Mareva injunction as preliminary relief in aid of foreign
proceedings.
Yet, should preliminary relief generally be available where the
domestic court stays an action on forum non conveniens grounds in
favour of trial in a foreign forum? Lord Goff thought so, as he
suggested in the leading English case on forum non conveniens doctrine,
Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd. ("The Spiliada") that
it would not, I think, normally be wrong to allow a plaintiff to keep the benefit of security
obtained by commencing proceedings here, while at the same time granting a stay of
proceedings in this country to enable the action to proceed in the appropriate forum.2 11
The import of Lord Goff's statement was addressed in Tortel
Communications Inc. v. Suntel, Inc.212  The plaintiff Ontario
corporations claimed a debt from a Georgia corporation and a Grand
Cayman corporation arising out of a telephone supply contract and
repair contract concerning activities in Ontario. The plaintiffs
discovered that a Manitoba company owed a debt to one of the
207 See also the cases cited supra note 79.
208 See TheAbidin Daver, [1984] AC. 398 (H.L.).
209 See Finers v. Miro, [1991] 1 W.L.R. 35 at 41 (C.A.); Trade Fortune, supra note 69; and Def
American,supra note 67.
210 Channel Tunnel, supra note 45 at 363.
211 [1986] 3 All E.R. 843 at 860 (H.L) [hereinafter The Spiliada].
212 (1994), 97 Man. R. (2d) 265 (C.A.) [hereinafter Tortel].
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defendants on an unrelated contract. They sued the defendants in
Manitoba, served the defendants with process exjuris without leave, and
obtained prejudgment garnishment of the debt. The defendants
succeeded in bringing applications to have the service set aside, to stay
the proceedings on the grounds that Manitoba was a forum non
conveniens, and to have the prejudgment garnishment set aside.
The Manitoba Court of Appeal upheld the setting aside of
service ex juris and the stay of the action on forum non conveniens
grounds. The underlying dispute had "no real and substantial
connection" with Manitoba, and none of the parties carried on business
there. The plaintiffs, relying upon Lord Goff's statement in The
Spiliada, argued that the garnished funds should be held pending the
disposition of the action abroad. Philp J.A., for the majority, noted that
Lord Goff had indicated that a domestic court may, at least in some
circumstances, allow a plaintiff to maintain a prejudgment remedy in
place even where the action is stayed on forum non conveniens grounds
in favour of trial abroad. However, Philp J.A. narrowed the application
of this doctrine to the circumstances of The Spiliada, where it had been
determined that the plaintiff had acted reasonably in bringing the initial
proceedings in the domestic forum. By contrast, in Tortel, the plaintiffs'
underlying cause of action had no real and substantial connection with
Manitoba.
Twaddle J.A., concurring, agreed that the mere presence of
assets within the jurisdiction provided an inadequate basis to allow
service exjuris or to establish a real and substantial connection with the
Manitoba courts. However, he suggested that the court's jurisdiction
might be properly exercised in circumstances where the plaintiff could
demonstrate that "without the security provided by the Manitoba asset,
any judgment the plaintiff might obtain elsewhere would likely remain
unsatisfied."213 The plaintiff had not advanced such evidence.
Although there may be attractions from the plaintiff's point of
view to bringing an action in the forum and seeking a Mareva injunction
as ancillary relief, in some cases a plaintiff may be precluded from
following such a course of action. First, the plaintiff may not have a
cause of action against the defendant in the jurisdiction. Second, he may
be barred from commencing actions other than in a specified forum due
to a choice of court clause. (Note, however, that it is a matter of debate
as to whether a choice of court clause can be said to preclude an
213Ibid.at 269.
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application to another forum for preliminary and protective relief.214)
Third, the plaintiff might be the subject of a foreign anti-suit injunction
barring him from bringing applications in foreign courts (again, it may
be a matter of interpretation as to whether an anti-suit injunction
extends to preliminary and protective relief).
Fourth, domestic courts commonly take a dim view of duplicative
litigation. A plaintiff who seeks to initiate what appears to a domestic
court to be parallel proceedings may find that the court not only stays
the action, but also declines to award any preliminary and protective
relief.215 Finally, and importantly, speed is often of the essence where a
Mareva injunction is sought in aid of foreign proceedings (as it is in the
case of purely domestic Mareva injunctions). Having to bring a full-
fledged action in a domestic court in order to secure a Mareva injunction
in favour of foreign proceedings will be time-consuming and expensive:
and a pointless formality as well, if all that is really sought is preliminary
and protective relief in aid of foreign proceedings.
Accordingly, although bringing an action in the forum may be an
effective technique for a plaintiff engaged in litigation abroad to secure
the necessary protective and provisional measures in aid of those
proceedings, there should be no requirement that he or she should do
so. Under the approach outlined in this article, bringing an action in
order to secure a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign proceedings would,
in most cases, be dilatory. A motion could simply be made for the
Mareva relief without the necessity of bringing an action in the forum.
D. Why Not Seek Mareva-Type Relieffrom the Foreign Court?
Should a party seeking a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign
proceedings be required, as a preliminary step, to seek such relief as is
available from the foreign court where the substantive dispute is to be
adjudicated? In an area of law where domestic courts are often
concerned with the requirements of comity, it might be thought that
every attempt to exhaust foreign remedies should be required before the
domestic court will order a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign
214 See further discussion of this point in Part VI(G), below.
215 See Australian Commercial Research and Development Ltd v. AN.Z. McCaughan Merchant
Bank Ltd, [1989] 3 All E.R. 65 at 69 (Ch.D).
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proceedings.216 Lord Mustill in Channel Tunnel gave voice to the
concern that the domestic court not interfere with the process of the
foreign court, which might suggest that a restrictive approach be taken to
the awarding of Mareva relief in aid of foreign proceedings. 217
Despite these concerns, a number of factors militate against the
imposition of a requirement that efforts to secure preliminary or
protective relief be made initially in the foreign court or tribunal before
a domestic court can entertain a motion for a Mareva injunction in aid of
foreign proceedings. First, the desired remedy may simply not be
available in the foreign court. If it is available, then the domestic court
should consider facilitating the enforcement of the foreign order in the
domestic jurisdiction. Second, the Amchem rule for anti-suit injunctions
is inappropriate in the Mareva injunction context. Motions for Mareva
injunctions are necessarily made ex parte. The element of surprise is
invariably essential. Accordingly, the better view is that there should be
no "exhaustion of local remedies" requirement. A motion for revision
or dissolution of a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign proceedings can
always be brought by the defendant, and a ruling by the foreign court
would certainly constitute a material change for this purpose. However,
if interim relief has already been sought from and refused by the foreign
court or tribunal, this would be a factor suggesting that a Canadian court
should similarly refuse such relief.218
E. Recourse to Other Domestic Legislation
There are, of course, a number of other forms of protective and
provisional relief to which a plaintiff may wish to have recourse. Apart
from Mareva injunctions, these include injunctions to restrain fraudulent
conveyances, 219 Anton Piller orders.2 20 orders appointing a receiver,221
216 See Amchem, supra note 50. As a precondition for obtaining an anti-suit injunction, the
applicant must first seek relief in the form of a stay of proceedings on the basis of the forum non
conveniens doctrine from the foreign court so that the Canadian court will not order an anti-suit
injunction which would preempt the foreign court's determination of its own jurisdiction. See also
DefAmerican, supra note 67.
217 Channel Tunnel, supra note 45 at 358.
218 See Westin & Chrocziel, supra note 59 at 744. The domestic court should carefully
examine the foreign court's reasons, if any, for refusing to order the requested relief.
219 The courts have long maintained a jurisdiction to grant interlocutory protective relief in
cases of alleged fraud. The fraud jurisdiction was always seen as an exception to the rule in Listerv.
Stubbs (1890), 45 Ch.D. 1 (C.A.) [hereinafter Lister], namely that the courts will not allow execution
prior to judgment: see Campbell v. Campbell (1881), 29 Gr. 252 (Ont. H.C.J.). It should be noted
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injunctions to preserve or to restrain the disposition of a specific asset
pending trial,222 and absconding debtors legislation,223 among others.224
The circumstances of some cases may enable a plaintiff to make use of
such measures in order to freeze the assets of the defendant in the
jurisdiction without the need to apply for a Mareva injunction. If so, the
plaintiff should be entitled to do so, and Mareva injunction relief may be
unnecessarily duplicative.
Similarly, in some situations a plaintiff may be able to secure the
necessary relief by way of application under the Bankruptcy and
that the fraud jurisdiction is distinct from the jurisdiction to award Mareva injunctions. Indeed, one
objection to the recognition of the Mareva injunction in Canada was that provincial legislation had
rendered such injunctions superfluous, although this argument was rejected inAetna, supra note 11
at 179-80. The fraud jurisdiction, unlike a Mareva injunction, is purely retrospective: it may be
invoked only where a fraudulent conveyance has already taken place in order to restrain the
defendant from making any further conveyance or to set aside the impugned conveyance. On the
fraud jurisdiction, see Mills v. Petrovik (1980), 30 O.R. (2d) 238 (H.C.J.), an exception to Lister in
cases of fraud, tending to assimilate the fraud jurisdiction to the Mareva injunction jurisdiction. See
also Robert Reiser & Co. Inc. v. Nadore Food Processing Equipment Ltd. (1977), 17 O.R. (2d) 717
(H.C.J.) (plaintiff must be a creditor and it must be clear that a fraud has been committed); and
Canadian Tire Corp. Ltd. v. Summers, [1992] O.J. No. 2042 (Gen. Div.) (QL) (clear evidence of
fraud required). The rise of the Mareva injunction has largely superseded the fraud jurisdiction.
Under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.29, s. 2, a non-judgment creditor (i.e., a
creditor with an unliquidated claim) may seek an order, because the provision refers to "creditors or
others," which is defined very broadly: see Holdenreid v. Holdenreid (1978), 29 C.B.R. (N.S.) 138 at
147 (Ont. H.C.J.) (A non-judgment creditor must demonstrate, however, that she possessed a valid
claim against the defendant); and Owen Sound General and Marine Hospital v. Mann, [1953] O.R.
643 (H.C.J.). See generally M.A. Springman, G.R. Stewart & M.J. MacNaughton, Fraudulent
Conveyances and Preferences (Toronto: Carswell, 1994) § 12(a)(ii).
220 Anton Piller ICG. v. Manufacturing Processes Ltd., [1976] Ch. 55 (C.A.) [hereinafterAnton
Piller]; see Ontario Rules, supra note 28, r. 45. The Canadian law is discussed in Sharpe, supra note 9
at 2.1100-2.1300.
221 A court may order the appointment of a receiver or manager in order to preserve and
operate a debtor's assets: Ontario Rules, supra note 28, r. 41 and r. 45.01; and Courts of Justice Act,
supra note 13, s. 101. See also Ontario Rules, r. 14.05(3)(g) (originating process). A receiver may be
appointed in aid of a Mareva injunction: Ballabil Holdings Pty. Ltd. v. Hospital Products Ltd. (1985),
1 N.S.W.L.R. 155 (C.A.).
222 Ontario Rules, supra note 28, r. 45.
223 Absconding Debtors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A.2, s. 2(1) (property of Ontario resident who
departs province with intent to defraud creditors or to avoid arrest or service may be seized and
attached).
224 The law of some provinces provides for pre-judgment garnishment, e.g., Alberta, British
Columbia, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan. The civil procedure rules of Nova Scotia and
Prince Edward Island specifically provide for pre-judgment attachment. See discussion in Ontario
Law Reform Commission, Report on the Enforcement of Judgment Debts and Related Matters, vol. 4
(Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1983) vol. 4, c. 3; and Institute of Law Research and
Reform, Prejudgment Remedies for Unsecured Claimants, Report No. 50 (Edmonton: ILRR, 1988).
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Insolvency Act,225 or the Winding Up Act,226 or under federal or
provincial corporate legislation.2 27 The assistance of domestic courts
may be sought in aid of a foreign receiver.228 Nothing about the Mareva
injunction in aid of foreign proceedings precludes recourse to other
measures, and where available, a plaintiff will want to review them for
their utility in the particular circumstances. Yet the speed and
effectiveness of Mareva relief, and its prospective nature, means that it,
alone, may provide a remedy in circumstances in which other provisional
and protective measures do not. Indeed, that is why the Mareva
injunction originated in the first place.
F. The Mareva Injunction in Aid of Foreign Proceedings as the
Corollary to a Worldwide Mareva Injunction?
An analysis of worldwide Mareva injunctions is instructive
because in many ways the injunction in aid of foreign proceedings is the
mirror image of the worldwide Mareva injunction. A worldwide Mareva
injunction is most likely to be ordered when the defendant has
insufficient assets within the jurisdiction to satisfy a potential judgment
in the forum, but does have sufficient assets outside the jurisdiction to
do so. The theory, then, is that by freezing the assets of the defendant
outside the jurisdiction, the plaintiff could bring an action in the forum
and if successful, attempt to enforce the judgment abroad against the
225 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as am. by S.C. 1992, c. 27, s. 2.
226 R.S.C. 1985, c. W-1l.
227 See J. Honsberger, "Reaching Canadian Assets of Foreign Debtors Through Local or
Foreign Bankruptcy Proceedings" (1993), 18 C.B.R. (3d) 301. See also P. St.J. Smart,
"Safeguarding Assets in International Litigation: The Insolvency Option" (1996) 112 L.Q. Rev. 397;
and G. Lightman & G. Moss, The Law of Receivers of Companies, 2d ed. (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1994) at 336.
228 See Price Waterhouse Ltd. v. Paribas Bank of Canada (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 176
(N.S.S.C.T.D.) (recognition of Ontario receiver in Nova Scotia); C.LB.C. v. Idanell Korner Ranch
Ltd. (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 184 (Sask. Q.B.) (recognition of B.C. receiver in Saskatchewan); See C.A.
Kennedy Co. Ltd. v. Stibbe-Monk Ltd. and Dorothea Knitting Mills Ltd. (1976), 14 O.R. (2d) 439 (Div.
CL) (recognition of foreign receiver); Re HT (1975), 8 O.R. (2d) 359 (H.C.J.) (vesting Ontario
assets in liquidator in aid of Luxembourg liquidation). Schemmer v. Property Resources Ltd., [1975]
Ch. 273, is sometimes mistakenly said to stand for the proposition that English courts are
traditionally unwilling to exercise their powers in support of a receiver appointed by a foreign court.
But a closer reading of the case indicates that Goulding J.'s refusal to lend aid to a foreign
receivership order was limited to the facts of the case, namely, that there was an insufficient
connection between the defendant and the jurisdiction in which the receiver was appointed to justify
recognition of the foreign court's order in England. As well, the American securities legislation
upon which the plaintiff's cause of action was based was a penal law, thus unenforceable in England.
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defendant's frozen foreign assets. The pre-judgment Mareva injunction
prevents the defendant from dissipating her assets in the meantime in an
effort to frustrate the forum court's judgment.
Exactly the reverse happens in the case of a Mareva injunction in
aid of foreign proceedings: domestic (and, in exceptional circumstances,
perhaps foreign assets as well) are preserved in order that the defendant
may not thumb her nose at a foreign judgment, particularly given that
the foreign judgment will in all likelihood be enforced in the forum.
Indeed, it could be argued that the Mareva injunction in aid of foreign
proceedings is much more respectful of comity and jurisdictional
concerns than the worldwide Mareva injunction, because it allows the
court in whose territorial jurisdiction the assets are located to determine
whether or not to order an injunction over assets located there, rather
than facing the difficulties which may arise from the extravagant
jurisdiction claimed by a worldwide Mareva injunction.
It follows, therefore, that except in the most compelling and
unusual cases, Mareva injunctions in aid of foreign proceedings should
address only assets within the territorial jurisdiction of the domestic
court 2 29 Admittedly, difficult issues may arise as to how to determine
the situs of intangible assets for this purpose, particularly given that
different national laws may come to conflicting conclusions as to where a
given asset is located. The courts have repeatedly warned that
worldwide Mareva injunctions will be awarded only in "extreme" or
"rare" circumstances: this should be even more so for worldwide Mareva
injunctions in aid of foreign proceedings, although even they may be
appropriate in such extreme circumstances.230
The corollary of a restrictive approach to worldwide Mareva
injunctions is an expansion of the jurisdiction to award Mareva relief in
aid of foreign proceedings. Given that domestic courts have expressed
the concern that Mareva relief should generally be sought in the state in
which the assets sought to be "frozen" are located,231 this will necessarily
mean that recourse should be had to a Canadian court in circumstances
in which litigation is proceeding abroad but assets which might satisfy an
eventual judgment are located in Canada.232
229 Oriental Commercial, supra note 72 at 1389, Lord Donaldson M.R.; and Mercedes-Benz,
supra note 7, Lord Nicholls (dissenting).
230 Schlosser, supra note 2 at 163 (arguing in favour of availability of worldwide Mareva
injunctions in aid of foreign proceedings).
231 The Xing Su Hal, supra note 64 at 24.
2 32 See also supra note 204.
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G. Cases Involving Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses
A strong argument could be made that, even though the courts
technically possess the substantive jurisdiction to award interim relief in
cases in which a dispute arises over a contract which contains an
exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of a foreign forum, the domestic
courts should decline to order interim relief in such cases.233 The
question as to whether an agreement by the parties to confer exclusive
jurisdiction upon certain courts or arbitral bodies to resolve their
disputes should preclude resort to another court for a protective Mareva
injunction has also arisen in the context of the Brussels/Lugano
Conventions.234 There is no principled reason why parties to a contract
should not have the autonomy to exclude recourse by one or both parties
to particular courts for provisional or protective relief. Given that, in
practical terms, a Mareva injunction is likely to influence the terms of
resolution of the substantive dispute by the foreign court or arbitral
body, domestic courts might be wary in such cases of ordering interim
relief.
In some cases, it might be demonstrable that the award of
protective and provisional relief by a foreign court would be contrary to
the intention of the parties to the contract. The debate as to the proper
scope to be given to exclusive jurisdiction clauses in international
contracts is likely to play itself out in the context of a motion seeking a
Mareva injunction in aid of foreign proceedings where the motion might
technically be considered to have been brought in breach of an exclusive
jurisdiction clause 35 More difficult than the theoretical question as to
whether the parties may exclude recourse to protective measures by
particular courts is the practical issue of whether they have, by a
particular clause in a contract, actually done so. This will be a matter of
interpretation according to the law of contract of the jurisdiction in
which the party seeking provisional relief brings its motion.
Although Canadian courts are never bound by the choice of the
parties to a contract, in most cases there are strong reasons for enforcing
such choices. Given that Mareva injunctions are likely to be awarded
only in circumstances bordering on fraud, it might be better to adopt a
rule of contract interpretation that, while allowing parties to contract
233 Channel Tunnel, supra note 45 at 368, Lord Mustill.
234 For example, does art. 17 of the Convention trump art. 24?
235 See The Siskina, supra note 35; Channel Tunnel, supra note 45; and Air Zaire, supra note
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away explicitly their rights to pursue interim relief from foreign courts,
would generally presume against such contracting-out. Courts observing
fraudulent conduct are likely not to respect the choice of the parties, so
perhaps the question of whether parties to an international contract can
choose to contract out of interim relief issued by foreign courts is of only
theoretical interest. 23 6
H. The Distinction Between a Mareva Injunction in Aid of Foreign
Proceedings and the Recognition/Enforcement of a Foreign Order
In making a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign proceedings, the
Canadian court is not being asked to recognize or enforce a foreign
order, but is instead making its own order. What effect should be given
by a Canadian court to a foreign freezing order of the Mareva type if a
party to foreign litigation seeks to have it enforced here? In some ways,
the issue is a traditional recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments question, save for the fact that the common law has
traditionally been extremely wary of giving effect to foreign injunctions
of any kind.237
For one, the common law has insisted upon a requirement that a
foreign judgment be final and conclusive between the parties, in the
sense that it would resolve the controversies between them. There is
normally good reason for such a requirement: it ensures that the
domestic court is not drawn into an investigation of the process of the
foreign court, or faced with the prospect of enforcing a foreign order
which is subsequently modified or lifted. It is unclear whether a foreign
injunction of the Mareva type would fulfil this requirement, given that
according to the traditional rules, a foreign order of specific
performance or the specific delivery or restitution of chattels will not be
recognisedV38 So, although there is no theoretical reason to refuse to
236 See, by analogy, Lemenda Trading Co. Ltd. v. African Middle East Petroleum Co. Ltd.,
[1988] Q.B. 448 (Comm. Ct.).
2 3 7 See Dicey & Morris, supra note 36 at 462. But see R.W. White, "Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Equity" (1982) 9 Sydney L. Rev. 630.
238 P.M. North & J.J. Fawcett, Cheshire and North's Private International Law, 12th ed.
(London: Butterworths, 1992) at 367. However, some statutory recognition schemes specifically
provide for the recognition of non-money provisions, including injunctions: see CIJA 1982, Sch. 7,
para. 1. See also White v. Verkouille, [1990] 2 Qd. R. 191 (S.C.) (recognizing receiver appointed by
Nevada court and allowing him to take possession of the defendant's Queensland bank accounts,
given that there was a sufficient connection between the Nevada court and the defendant). But
compare Re Resort Condominiums Int'l Ina, [1995] 1 Qd. R. 406 (S.C.) (declining to give effect to
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enforce foreign interim relief, practical considerations indicate that a
domestic court may feel more comfortable making its own order in aid
of foreign proceedings.
Yet, in the face of increasing pressure from litigants, this
historical reluctance may be dissolving. In recent years, American courts
have shown a greater willingness to give effect to protective and
provisional measures (normally Mareva-type freezing orders) issued by
foreign courts.239 However, there is a residual reluctance to do so, as
demonstrated by Pilkington Bros. PLC V. AFG Industries Inc.240 There, a
United States district court declined to give effect to an English interim
injunction, in part because it was concerned that comity not be affected
by a possible misinterpretation of the injunction on its part. The court
also expressed concern that it not be seen to be interfering in English
arbitration proceedings which had been the subject of contractual
agreement. Further, the court did not want to initiate a "race to the
courthouse" between two or more fora, and was worried that
modifications to the order in one forum might not be accepted in the
other. It was better, in the court's view, for the English court to receive
all applications for modification of the injunction's terms. In a later
case, a federal district court also refused to enforce an ex parte
temporary restraining order issued by the English High Court 2 41
It is unclear whether the Pilkington court's reluctance to enforce
a foreign injunction was motivated more by its analysis of the particular
circumstances or simply a lack of comfort with the novelty of the
situation before it. In any event, the concerns it raised were real ones.
Yet, if courts are going to continue to take a dim view of the
extraterritorial extension of foreign injunctive relief, then they are likely
to be faced with an increasing number of requests to lend their
interlocutory or procedural orders of foreign arbitrator).
239 See Cardenas v. Solis, 570 So.2d 996 (Fla. App. 3d Dist. 1990), rev. denied, 581 So. 2d 163
(Fla. 1991) [hereinafter Cardenas] (upholding, on basis of comity, temporary injunction freezing half
of funds contained in defendant's Miami bank accounts to preserve the status quo pending
disposition of domestic relations suit in Guatemala); Nahar v. Nahar, 656 So.2d 225 (Fla. App. 3d
Dist. 1995) (adopts broader approach of the Restatement rather than more qualified approach of
Cardenas); de Pacanins v. Pacanins, 650 So.2d 1028 (Fla. App. 3d Dist. 1995) (recognition of
Venezuelan letters rogatory seeking freeze of assets in U.S. pending outcome of Venezuelan
litigation; follows Cardenas). See also Belle Island nv. Co. v. Feingold, 453 So.2d 1142 (Fla. App. 3d
Dist. 1984), cause dismissed, 459 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 1984) (allowing privately appointed receiver in St.
Vincent who had obtained an injunction restraining defendant from dealing with assets to enforce
injunction in Florida). See generally Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, (St Paul, Minn.:
American Law Institute, 1971) §§ 98 and 102, comment g.
240 581 F.Supp. 1039 at 1045 (D. Del. 1984) [hereinafter Pilkington].
241 Robinson v. Jardine Insurance Brokers Intemationa4 Ltd., 856 F.Supp. 554 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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assistance to foreign courts in the form of giving effect to foreign
protective orders against assets located within their own territorial
jurisdiction.
It is perhaps understandable that domestic courts would be
reluctant to "enforce" foreign injunctive relief which may be amenable
to revision by the foreign court, and thus productive of inconsistencies.
Whatever its motivation, this reluctance suggests that domestic courts
should be more willing to make their own orders in aid of foreign
litigation. Making their own orders would have the advantage of giving
domestic courts more control over the terms and conditions upon which
such injunctions would be ordered, thus largely avoiding the problems
which so troubled the court in Pilkington.
VII. CONCLUSION
The development of a substantive jurisdiction to award Mareva
injunctions in aid of foreign legal proceedings is much needed. The
recognition of such a jurisdiction will ensure that the process of courts is
not abused by unscrupulous defendants, and that illegitimate
judgment-proofing is not rewarded. Given this demonstrated need, the
question arises as to whether Canadian courts will broaden the scope of
the jurisdiction to award Mareva relief to include Mareva injunctions in
aid of foreign legal proceedings.
I have argued that not only are there strong reasons to take this
step, but that it can be taken on the basis of principles extracted from
existing cases. Moreover, extending Mareva relief to encompass orders
in aid of foreign proceedings will not lead Canadian courts to take
substantive jurisdiction over disputes which have no real and substantial
connection to Canada. To the contrary, recognition that provisional and
protective measures are purely procedural in nature and do not affect
the substance of the dispute will enable the courts to meet the needs of
parties engaged in transnational litigation.
Recurring dissatisfaction with Siskina's restrictive account of the
courts' jurisdiction to award Mareva relief has finally asserted itself in
BMWE. Now that Siskina is dead in Canada, some attention must be paid
as to how the concerns which the doctrine in that case wrestled with
should be addressed. Principles to guide the evolution of the exercise of
the courts' discretion to order Mareva relief in aid of foreign proceedings
have begun to emerge. I have outlined those principles, and argued that
if they are followed, they will assuage any residual concerns which the
courts may have that they not be faced with litigants seeking injunctive
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relief in the absence of a justiciable cause of action, while at the same
time, allow the courts to order Mareva relief in aid of foreign
proceedings.
